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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is a judicial process purporting to regulate and adjust the financial
relationships between debtors and creditors which come into a deadlock. In the modern
United States, bankruptcy has become a concept pervading each corner of the social and
economic lives. It touches mass tort victims, large corporations, small family business,
government institutions, and even normal individuals.
The appearance of the modern bankruptcy law of the United States is signalled by
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978,
1
which, together with later
amendments, constitute the current Bankruptcy Code of the United States. It is well
established that the Bankruptcy Code serves a fundamental and prominent function, that
is to help financially depressed debtors to gain a "fresh start" by way of debt discharge in
the bankruptcy process. Such fresh start policy is a great breakthrough to the traditional
bankruptcy concept, and is unique in the world-wide bankruptcy legislation.
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy filings have multiplied
dramatically. The bankruptcy system not only helps debtors to solve their financial
hardships, which alleviates the pressure to the society possibly arising of their financial
collapse; but also help them strategically restructure their financial or business affairs.
However, the true world is never a vacuum. Among massive bankruptcy filings, there are
a certain number of debtors who intend to simply eliminate or get rid of their obligations
owing to creditors by way of discharge, or to manipulate the bankruptcy system to
frustrate creditors' efforts which are made to ensure or protect their own interests.
I
Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2349 (1979) (codified as amended at
II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
2Bankruptcy fraud exists nation-wide which also leads to criminal prosecution to the
bankruptcy filers. According to an article in the Los Angeles Times in March 1, 1996, a
federal bankruptcy fraud investigation called Operation Total Disclosure suggested that
as many as one in 10 bankruptcy filings may involve fraud.2 The criminal charges to
fraud bankruptcy filers may include making false statements in connection with a
bankruptcy filing, filing under a false name and using bankruptcy filings to dodge
foreclosure.
The discussion regarding the central justification of the "fresh start" policy of the
modern bankruptcy law has never ended up with a conclusion. Some commentators
believe there should be some moral justifications for debtors' financial relief from
bankruptcy, which can help restraint and regulate their conduct in the whole bankruptcy
process. Good faith is regarded as one of such justifications. 5
Good faith is a concept in both moral and legal means. As a legal concept in the
bankruptcy context, the Bankruptcy Code does have statutory requirements for debtors'
good faith which is directly related to the realization of their debt discharge. However,
neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history has ever defined "good faith" or
provided any guidance for its application. As a result, an interesting phenomenon occurs
in the bankruptcy practice: courts develop a variety of rules to define and apply the
statutory good faith requirement in their case decisions; in the mean time, by using their
own judicial powers, they also imposes their own good faith requirements which are not
included in the Bankruptcy Code on debtors in each bankruptcy proceeding. Such judicial
activities are comparatively independent of the bankruptcy legislation. On the other hand,
without any legislative or judicial guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, the
rules and standards developed by courts vary greatly.
3-5-96 West's Legal News 1 154, 1996 WL 258877.
'id.
4
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification For Financial Rehabilitation of the
Consumer Debtor, 48 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 515 (1991).
"Id.
3This thesis will discuss good faith in the legal context, especially dealing with the
above-mentioned phenomenon regarding the debtors' good faith in US bankruptcy
proceedings. The discussion will be structured on the basis of the writer's understanding
of the bankruptcy concept established by the US Bankruptcy Code. By way of analyzing
different judicially-made rules and standards, this thesis will attempt to reveal how to
define the traditional good faith doctrine in the bankruptcy context; and, in the common
law system, how and to what extent courts could use their judicial powers to explain and
apply the statutory provisions which are not supported by sufficient and clarified
legislative interpretation; and how to deal with the relationship between those statutory
provisions and those judicially-made rules and standards.
The first chapter of this thesis will give a brief overview of the modern
bankruptcy concept, illustrated by the legislative development of the US bankruptcy law;
the second chapter will describe the historical development and the current status of the
good faith doctrine in the US bankruptcy legislation and judicial practice; from the third
chapter, it will analyse the good faith requirement, either a statutory or a judicially-made
one, in each bankruptcy proceeding, including liquidation, reorganization, and liquidation
plus reorganization.
CHAPTER I
MODERN BANKRUPTCY CONCEPT
The development of the US bankruptcy legislation has a long and dynamic
history, which was in line with its economic and interstate commercial development.
Although the US Constitution empowered Congress to establish "uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,"6 Congress did not enact the first
federal bankruptcy statute until 1800. It was designed as a temporary measure and
nothing more than a copy of the then-effective English bankruptcy law. 7 As a purely
creditor remedy, it only permitted creditors to file bankruptcy and only merchants could
be eligible debtors. That statute was repealed after three years. The next major bankruptcy
act came out in 1841 also as a temporary measure to deal with a major national financial
crisis at that time and operated only more than one year, but it established the voluntary
bankruptcy concept for merchant debtors; the third major bankruptcy statute was adopted
in 1867 in response to the financial cataclysm caused by the American Civil War, and
corporations began to be permitted to take advantage of bankruptcy. Like its two
predecessors, it was abolished soon because of its ineffectiveness. These earliest
remarkable federal statutes were basically pro-creditors, offered only liquidation remedy
and imposed harsh restrictions on the property exemption and discharge of debtors, which
made the discharge actually difficult.
6
U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl.4.
7
The 1732 Statute of George II, 5 Geo.2, ch. 30 (1732).
5The first permanent bankruptcy statute in the American history would be the
Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, which was to meet the growing needs for a uniform
federal bankruptcy law for the development of interstate commerce. This Act was
substantially amended several times during its eighty-year enforcement period and began
to usher in liberal debtor treatment. It extended its shelter to more debtors in voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcies, and in some ways released the traditional restrictions on
exemptions and discharge. Through the Chandler Act in 1938,
9
which was treated as the
most significant amendment of the Act, reorganization was introduced as another remedy
provided by bankruptcy law.
The Act was replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978 10 in response to the
tremendous social and economic changes and consumer credit development taking place
in the new century. Unlike all its predecessors, it was the first one which was not a
temporary enactment. As later amended in 1984, 1986 and 1994, so far this Act
constitutes the current US Bankruptcy Code. It builds up a comparatively complete
bankruptcy system by offering two fundamental kinds of relief, i.e., liquidation (governed
by Chapter 7 of the Code) and reorganization for voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy
petitions, and further designing different procedures for debtors' reorganization
depending on their categories, namely, consumer debtors (governed by Chapter 13),
14
corporations (governed by Chapter ll),
15
municipalities (governed by Chapter 9) and
8
Bankruptcy (Nelson) Act of July 1, 1898, ch 514, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Law Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2349 (1979) (codified as amended at 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330).
9
Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). This was the last major revision of
bankrutpcy law before the reform of 1978.
See supra note 1
.
11
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330(1996).
12
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1996) (Liquidation).
13
11 U.S.C. §§90 1-946 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts of A Municipality); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174(1996)
(Reorganization); 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts of A Family Farmer with Regular
Annual Income); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts of An Individual With Regular
Income).
14
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts of An Individual With Regular Income).
15
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 1 101-1 174 (1996) (Reorganization).
16
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts ofA Municipality).
6family farmers (governed by Chapter 12). Based upon its predecessors but having
greatly evolved, its underlying policies are switched from purely collecting debts for
creditors and punishing default debtors to seeking more equitable treatments to both
creditors and debtors. As a law of equity, the current Bankruptcy Code is designed to
serve two basic purposes: (1) to relieve debtors from overburdensome financial
obligations and enable them to return to the social economic life with a fresh start; and (2)
to provide fair and equitable treatment to creditors.
Developing from a pro-creditor statute to a pro-debtor one, the modern
bankruptcy law is "devoted to the plight of debtors who find themselves overwhelmed by
1 ft
financial burdens and unable to meet their debt obligations." Although in theory it is
also a legal subject regulating debtor-creditor relations, unlike traditional state debt
collection laws which provide remedies for particular creditors, the bankruptcy law
governs the relationship among one debtor and its multiple creditors with conflicting
interests. It is more realistic about the debtor's poor financial situation and more
concerned about the debtor's financial future as well as the influence on the social
community by its otherwise financial collapse. As a federal statute, the Bankruptcy Code
highly relies on the state debtor-creditor laws, but parallel to them as an alternative
remedy. It recognizes the substantial rights and obligations among creditors and debtors
regulated by such state laws, but further modifies them by providing collective debt
collection procedures under the administration of bankruptcy courts, in order to prevent
debtors from repeated harassment of creditors by forcing state debt collection procedures,
and promote equal or equitable treatment to creditors which likewise can not be
10
warranted by state debt collection procedures. Specifically, such collective debt
17
11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1996) (Adjustment of Debts of A Family Farmer with Regular Annual
Income).
18
Veryl Victoria Miles, Assessing Modern Bankruptcy Law: An Example ofJustice, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev.
1025(1996).
19
See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986). _
20
Lawence Ponoroff, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of An Evoving Bankruptcy
Policy, 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 919, 920 (1991)
7collection is realized by either liquidation or reorganization, and the modification of the
traditional rights and obligations, reflected in the Bankruptcy Code, appears to be more
advantageous to debtors than to creditors. First of all, it almost imposes no explicit barrier
for debtors' access to bankruptcy proceedings, with the exception that some entities, such
as railroads, banks and insurance companies, can not file bankruptcy for policy reasons. 21
It does not require debtors, other than municipalities, to be insolvent when filing
bankruptcy. When a bankruptcy petition is filed, all current or potential debt collection
actions shall be automatically stayed, until the case is closed, dismissed or the discharge
22
is granted. Such stay gives the debtor a breathing spell to avoid being harassed by
creditors' prepetition claims, even it might run the risk that the value of the debtor's
23 ii>
property will be depreciated. The debtors' contractual obligations under prepetiton
executory contracts or unexpired leases may be rescinded. In case of liquidation, the
individual debtor can legally keep a part of his assets according to Bankruptcy Code or
his own state law beyond the trustee and his creditors' reach, even some liens on such
assets can be avoided.
25 By surrendering all of his non-exempt property to the bankruptcy
trustee, which will be converted into cash and distributed to allowed creditors, the
debtor is granted a discharge of his prepetition debts. Unless the debtor is not a natural
person or is guilty of certain specified conduct,
27
he is discharged from liability upon any
debts remaining unpaid, except those that may not be discharged under the Bankruptcy
Code.
28
In case of reorganization, the debtor may retain possession of his assets by
21
1 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1996) (Who may be a debtor)
'
1 U.S.C. § 362 (1996) (Automatic Stay).
23
At this time, the creditor can be given extra protections on their interests in the bankruptcy estate in order
to keep the stay, or the stay could be lifted upon request for lack of adquate protection of creditors or lack
of equity and reasonable possibility of reorganization within reasonable time. See 11 U.S.C. §361 (1996)
(Adequate Protection), 1 1 U.S.C. § 362 (b) (1996).
24
1 1 U.S.C. § 365 (1996) (Executory contract and unexpired lease).
25
1 1 U.S.C. § 522 (1996) (Exemption).
26
1 1 U.S.C. § 704 (1996) (Duties of Trustees), 1 1 U.S.C. § 541 (Property of the Estate).
27
1 1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1996) (corporations and partnerships are ineligible for discharge under Chapter
7); 1 1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(10) (description of conducts for which the debtor may be denied a discharge).
28
1 1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)-(18) (1996). (Descriptions of debts which can not be discharged under Chapter 7).
8agreeing to repay his creditors with its postpetition income within several years.29 The
debtor accomplishes this by developing a plan of repayment30 subject to the confirmation
of the bankruptcy court, in which its pre-existing obligations to creditors can be altered,
or prolonged or even cancelled. Upon confirmation of the plan32 or completion of his
repayments under the plan or his efforts to make payments under the plan,33 he might be
discharged of all debts provided in the plan, except those legally nondischargeable ones.34
On the other hand, unlike the state nonbankruptcy laws which permit the quickest creditor
to attach and liquidate all the available assets of a defaulting debtor to pay his particular
obligation regardless of other creditors' claims, the Bankruptcy Code provides all
creditors an opportunity to equally participate in bankruptcy proceeding by way of the
automatic stay. Their claims to debtors, which are based on their prepetition legal
relationship regulated by nonbankruptcy law, especially state secured transaction
regulations, need to be allowed and revalued in the bankruptcy context, the debtor's
property transfer to a specific creditor within a certain period of time before petition is
prohibited as a preference. Classified into secured and unsecured creditors according to
37
the status of their prepetition rights, how much their prepetition rights can be realized,
for secured ones, depends upon the value of their collateral and the status of their claim in
the' collateral; for unsecured ones, it depends upon their priorities in all unsecured
creditors and the value of the whole bankruptcy estate.
29
H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 116, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A. 5963, 6079 [hereinafter
H.R. Rep. No. 595].
30
1 1 U.S.C. § 1322 (1996) (specifying requirements for the contents of the plan).
31
1 1 U.S.C. § 1 129 (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996) (confirmation of plan).
32
11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1996) (Effect of confirmation).
33
1 1 U.S.C. §1228 (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. § 1328 (1996) . Section 1228 (a) and 1328 (a) provide for mandatory
discharge if an individual or a family farmer debtor has completed all of the payments required by his
Chapter 13 plan. Section 1228(b) and 1328(b) give the court discretion to grant a "hardship" discharge to
an individual or a family farmer debtor who has failed to make all of the payments required.
34
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1996), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(l)-(3) (1996); See also 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1996)
(Exceptions to discharge)
35
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1996) (Allowance of claims or interests); 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1996) (Determination of
secured status).
36
1 1 U.S.C. § 547 (1996) (Preference).
37
1 1 U.S.C. § 506 (1996) (Determination of secured status).
9This prominent feature of the modern bankruptcy concept: the alteration of
obligations for the "fresh start" policy, brings up a new question. As one scholar pointed
out, "the relationship that exists between debtors and creditors is both bounded and
defined by a mixture of legal rules and human expectations regarding how the parties
"50
should behave toward each other and third parties" . The "fresh start" policy can not
offset an absolute obligation, as well as a moral expectation that a debtor should always
perform or repay what he owes to someone else. For the purpose of general justice, there
should be something to balance the fresh start policy and the absolute obligation of
debtors. Therefore who deserves such alteration of obligation as well as "fresh start",
what is the justification of such alteration, and how to protect the advantageous
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code from being abused or manipulated by debtors, become
very essential questions that the Bankruptcy Code itself or bankruptcy courts should
consider.
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code does make provisions to regulate debtors'
conduct in the bankruptcy proceedings; and bankruptcy courts, in the course of their
judicial activities, have also developed certain rules and standards to balance the debtors'
advantages and creditors' rights, among which "good faith" doctrine plays a fairly active
role.
For the purpose of this thesis, the good faith doctrine will be discussed as one of
the most important standards which helps to realize the two-pronged policies of the
Bankruptcy Code.
38
Linda J. Rusch, Bankrutpcy As a Revolutionary Concept: Good Faith Filing and A Theory ofObligation,
57 Mont. L. Rev. 49,49(1996).
CHAPTER II
GOOD FAITH IN BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
The good faith doctrine originates from the ancient Greek and Roman law, and is
widely recognized by civil law countries as a generalized duty in regulating various
commercial transactions. The American legal system was reluctant to impose expressly
such a generalized good faith duty even in the nineteenth century, but gradually accepted
it with the development of law and equity. Now good faith has become a basic
obligation pervading a variety of commercial transactions. The Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") might be the first legislative effort of the US legal system to give good
faith a statutory definition. It imposes an obligation of good faith in the performance and
enforcement of every contract or duty in any commercial transactions under its
regulations, such as sales, leases, commercial paper, bulk transfers, and secured
transactions. As it defines, "good faith" means "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction"; for merchants in the sales of goods, good their good faith means "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade".
The first appearance of the good faith doctrine in bankruptcy legislation was in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
43
and later in its several amendments before the Bankruptcy
Code. In those provisions, good faith was imposed as a threshold requirement on debtors'
conduct at two key links in the whole bankruptcy process: the filing of the bankruptcy
petition and the proposal of the reorganization plan, i.e., the debtor should file the
39
B. J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 Val. U. L. Rev. 705, 708 (1983).
40
Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Contract
Formation, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381, 384 (1978).
41
U.C.C. § 1-203(1992).
42
U.C.C. § 1-201, § 2-103, § 2-104 (1992).
43
See supra notes 8 and 9 and the accompanying text.
10
11
bankruptcy petition in good faith, and in case of reorganization, the debtor should
propose the reorganization plan in good faith.
Under Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, good faith was a condition of
confirmation of a reorganization proposal. As it permitted a bankruptcy debtor to offer
terms of composition to creditors and authorized the court to confirm the proposal upon
stated conditions, no offer of composition could be confirmed by the court unless "the
offer and its acceptance are in good faith, and have not been made or procured except as
herein provided, or by any means, promises, or acts herein forbidden."44
Later on, in the 1933 amendment of the Act, individual debtors or railroads, not
corporations, began to be required to file their bankruptcy petitions in good faith. The
court was required to approve it "if satisfied that such petition... has been filed in good
faith". Also in that amendment, farmers were permitted to effect a composition or
extension of time to pay their debts, correspondingly their proposal could be confirmed if
the court were satisfied that "the offer and acceptance are in good faith".
In the 1934 amendment, good faith became the petition filing requirement as well
as proposal confirmation requirement for corporate creditors, and also, the filing
requirement for municipality and certain political subdivisions. Even until then good
faith"had not been defined in either amendment.
In the 1938 amendment, good faith was reiterated to be the filing requirement and
confirmation requirement for corporate debtors, and the confirmation requirement for
other debtors.
48
Unlike previous provisions, although the amendment did not directly
define good faith, it did provide four distinct circumstances under which the petition
would not be deemed to have been filed in good faith. According to section 146 of the
Bankruptcy Act,
44
See In re Victory Construction Co., Inc., 9 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 1981).
45
Id. at 551-552, Section 74, and 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
46
Id. at 552, Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
47
Id., Section 77B(f)(6) and Section 80(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
48
Id. at 553, Section 141-144, and Section 221 of the Bankruptcy Act.
12
[W]ithout limiting the generality of the meaning of the term good faith, a
petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if (1) the petitioning
creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition;
or (2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition under the
Chapter XI of the Act, or it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of
reorganization can be effected; or (4) a prior proceeding is pending in any
court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would
be best served in such prior proceedings.49
Apparently the good faith doctrine had already played an active role in the pre-
Code legislation, especially in corporate reorganization proceedings, where good faith
was required for debtors at the time of filing the petition and proposing the reorganization
arrangement. In the meantime, the case law expanded the statutory provisions well
beyond corporate reorganization cases, and employed good faith as an entrance
requirement for obtaining any bankruptcy relief.
When the Bankruptcy Act was finally repealed by the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,
the statutory good faith filing requirement disappeared from the new textual language,
except in the reorganization proceeding for municipalities, where they were still required
to file the bankruptcy petition in good faith." No legislative history suggested any reason
for such disappearance. Meanwhile, good faith as a requirement for confirmation of the
reorganization plan remained applicable to different debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.
The court shall confirm a plan proposed by a corporate debtor, a family farmer or a
consumer debtor only if "the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law."" However, both the Bankruptcy Code and the legislative history
were still silent on the definition of "good faith", even had no circumstantial descriptions
on what constituted good faith or bad faith conducts. Such silence left the question to
courts, and led to great disparities among both legal commentators and courts regarding
49
Id.; section 146 of the Bankruptcy Act.
50
Charlestown Sav. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co.), 516 F. 2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975); Ira
Haupt & Co. v. Klebanow, 348 F. 2d 907 (2d Cir. 1965).
51
11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1996).
52
1 1 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(3) (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. §1225(a)(3) (1996), and 1 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1996).
13
how to understand and apply the traditional good faith doctrine under the bankruptcy
setting.
Since the UCC imposes the good faith duty to every party of commercial
transactions and is an important foundation of state creditor-debtor laws, and the
bankruptcy law is a kind of creditor-debtor laws, some courts opined that the meaning of
good faith defined by the UCC could be transposed to the bankruptcy context. 53 But it
seems not to be so easy. It is true that the UCC and Bankruptcy Code have substantial
connections, but they are founded on different concepts and for different purposes. The
UCC regulates performance and enforcement of obligations and rights among debtors and
creditors in commercial transactions for commercial purposes; the Bankruptcy Code, as
analysed in Chapter I, although highly relies upon the UCC with respect of the substantial
rights and obligations among debtors and creditors, it alters the performance and
enforcement of such rights and obligations in order to finally realize such rights and
obligations, it does not have a pure commercial nature but functions as a certain
procedure to solve the financial problems caused in commercial transactions. It is also
true that in the Bankruptcy Code, in addition to the good faith requirements for debtors in
filing their reorganization plans,
54
there are other good faith provisions regarding
transactions between a debtor and a third party, such as prepetition property transfers and
postpetition property sales or leases, under which good faith purchasers, lessees and
transferees shall be held harmless.
55 As such transactions are of normal commercial
nature and should be substantially governed by the relevant state nonbankruptcy
commercial laws adopting the UCC, the debtor and the third party should both have a
UCC good faith duty in such transactions. But such good faith duty is not the real concern
in the bankruptcy context.
53
In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1985).
54
1 1 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(3) (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1996).
55
11 U.S.C. § 363(m)(1996) (Use, sale or lease of property), 11 U.S.C. §548(c) (1996) (Fraudulent
transfers and obligations).
14
In light of the legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and the fact that the
Bankruptcy Code greatly alters the debtor's obligations owing to creditors, the real
concern in the bankruptcy legislation and judicial practice for debtors' good faith should
not be how they perform and enforce their obligations owing to creditors, but how they
utilize the beneficial proceedings provided by the Bankruptcy Code to perform and
enforce such obligations. Courts want to know what led the debtor to seek relief and what
the debtor's alternatives to bankruptcy may have been, and whether the debtor should
deserve the relief. The UCC definition of good faith, which is more in the commercial
sense, appears to be superficial and is not directly relevant to what is intended by good
faith in bankruptcy. On the other hand, as good faith doctrine itself is a very flexible and
subjective concept, it always attaches to specific acts of people. What constitutes good
faith might be different depending upon different backgrounds.
Therefore, good faith in the bankruptcy context should be a new concept which
strictly works within the Bankruptcy Code. Simple definition transposition from the UCC
is meaningless and unreasonable.
The next part of the thesis will discuss the good faith doctrine specifically in
different bankruptcy proceedings, which, for this purpose, including liquidation,
reorganzation and liquidation plus reorganization.
CHAPTER III
GOOD FAITH IN LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS
As there is no statutory definition of good faith in bankruptcy proceedings, courts
have developed a number of rules in the course of their case decisions regarding its
interpretation and application. Although the Bankruptcy Code has eliminated the explicit
good faith filing requirement for debtors entering any bankruptcy proceeding from its
statutory language, most courts still impose good faith as an entrance test for each
bankruptcy filing, even in the liquidation proceeding where any good faith requirement
has never been codified. However, courts take different positions as to the legitimacy of
such implied good faith filing requirement, to what extent it could be imposed, and what
standards should be utilized to examine the debtor's good faith in filing a liquidation
petition.
I. Judicially-made Good Faith Filing Requirement
.
Governed by Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the liquidation proceeding is
straight bankruptcy relief available to every type of eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code.
56 By filing a petition under Chapter 7, the debtor will terminate its relations with
creditors by surrendering all of its non-exempt property to the bankruptcy trustee, who
will be responsible for converting such non-exempt property to cash and distributing the
same to creditors. In return, the debtor will be granted a discharge from all dischargeable
debts under Chapter 7. The eligibility requirement for debtors to enter a Chapter 7
56
11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1996)
15
16
proceeding is quite generous. Unlike Chapter 13 cases, there are no minimum or
maximum debt limits for Chapter 7 debtors. 57
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the pre-Code Bankruptcy Act has or had ever
made any explicit statutory requirement for the debtor's good faith in the liquidation
proceeding. However, a majority of courts have established and recognized that the
debtor should also file a Chapter 7 petition in good faith, otherwise, it could be dismissed
on the ground of "lack of good faith" or "bad faith".
Courts derive this good faith requirement for Chapter 7 filings from the case law
in Chapter 11 and 13, which perhaps, as a result of the good faith requirement for
proposing a reorganization plan under the Bankruptcy Code58 and the good faith filing
requirement under the pre-Code Bankruptcy Act,
59
establishes that good faith is required
in filing a reorganization petition as well as proposing of a reorganization plan.
60
At the
beginning, in examining Chapter 7 filings, some courts simply relied upon such Chapter
1 1 and 1 3 case law and stated that good faith should be an implied requirement in the
filing of any bankruptcy petition and definitely should not be exceptional under Chapter
7. Later, several courts beginning with In re Khan, held that "good faith is an implicit
jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7." They found several reasons to support
therfiselves. First of all, they believed that such a good faith filing requirement was
inherent in the purpose of bankruptcy relief. As one of the primary purposes of
57
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1996).
58
11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1996).
59
Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act.
60
In re Victory Construction Company, Inc. 9 B.R. 549 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1981); In re Albany Partners
Limited, 749 F. 2d 670 (1 1th Cir. 1984); In re Thirtieth Place Inc., 30 B.R. 503 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).
61
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bankruptcy law is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes," it should give "the honest but unfortunate
debtors who [under Chapter 7] surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at
the time of the bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort;"
grounded on the fresh start in stead of a head start policy, the Bankruptcy Code should
serve "those persons who, despite their best efforts find themselves hopelessly adrift in
the sea of debts, and it is not intended to assist those who, despite their own misconduct,
are attempting to preserve a comfortable standard of living at the expense of their
creditors." Good faith and candor are necessary prerequisites to obtain a fresh start.
Meanwhile, they also relied on the traditional equitable rule of "clean hands" to
justify the imposing of such a judicially-made good faith filing requirement. Under the
so-called "clean hands" rule, the plaintiff will be denied equitable relief if he has
committed any wrongful or inequitable conduct which injured the defendant. As
bankruptcy law is a law of equity, and the bankruptcy court is a court of law, equity and
admiralty with an inherent contempt power,
69
"bankruptcy matters are...inherently
70
proceedings in equity. ..and must foster equitable results." The court should have
equitable power to grant equitable relief to those approaching the court with clean hands
and honest purpose, and the good faith filing requirement exactly comports with the
bankruptcy court's role.
64
In re Jones, 114 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1990), citing Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18, 21
(1970).
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Moreover, some courts suggested that the bankruptcy court, like any federal court,
has an inherent power to regulate its own docket to ensure that its process is not being
72
abused, to manage their own proceedings and to control the conduct of those who
appear before them. In invoking the inherent power to punish conduct which abuses the
judicial process, a court must exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction,
which may range from dismissal of a lawsuit to an assessment of an attorney's fee. 74
Such inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct is not displaced by
sanctions provided for by statutes and rules.
II. Application of the Judicially-made Good Faith Filing Requirement
1 . Reading the good faith filing requirement into the dismissal provisions of Chapter 7
Insisting on imposing such judicially-made good faith requirement to Chapter 7
debtors, courts have to find a statutory basis in the Bankruptcy Code to support them.
Section 707 has been found by a majority of courts as such a basis. They read the good
faith filing requirement in this section, which governs dismissal of Chapter 7 cases. As
provided in section 707,
[(a)] The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and
a hearing and only for cause, including (1) unreasonable delay by the
• debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) non-payment of any fees or
charges required under chapter 123 of title 28, and (3) failure of the debtor
in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as
the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case,
the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a
motion by the United States Trustee.
(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in
interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this
chapter whose debts are primary consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provision of this
72
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chapter. There shall be a presumption in favour of granting the relief
requested by the debtor.76
The two parts of dismissal provisions in section 707 did not come out at the same
time. Section 707(a) was adopted in 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act,77 which enumerated
three specific "causes" for which a Chapter 7 case may be dismissed. There is no
statutory definition of "cause", and the Rules of Construction of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that "includes" and "including" appearing in the Code language are not
78
limiting, therefore such three specific circumstances are not exhaustive, but only
illustrative descriptions. The courts accordingly believe they are given more space in this
section, to use their judicial discretion to dismiss a Chapter 7 case. They are implicitly
empowered to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for a "cause" other than three specific
circumstances. "Lack of good faith" has become the most important extrastatutory
cause to dismiss a Chapter 7 case, which is believed to prevent an unworthy debtor
80
tainting a filing for Chapter 7 relief from receiving any part of such relief. Any party in
interest can bring up "lack of good faith" as a cause in its motion to dismiss a Chapter 7
81
case, thereby the debtor is burdened to prove its good faith.
82
Added into the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, section 707(b) was designed
particularly for consumer debtors "in response to an increasing number of Chapter 7
83
bankruptcies filed each year by non-needy debtors." It introduced "an additional
restraint upon a debtor's ability to gain Chapter 7 relief, by allowing a bankruptcy court
76
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to deal equitably with the situation in which an unscrupulous debtor seeks to gain the
court's assistance in a scheme to take unfair advantage of his creditors."84 Prior to 1984,
debtors enjoyed a virtually unfettered right to a "fresh start" under Chapter 7, in exchange
for liquidating their nonexempt assets for the benefit of their creditors. 85 Unlike section
707(a), this subsection requires the bankruptcy court to find out the debtor's "substantial
abuse" sua sponte, rather than by motion of any party in interest. Congress provided no
definition of "substantial abuse". In Black's Law Dictionary, "abuse" is defined as "to
make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner contrary to the
natural or legal rules for its use, to make an extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse
one's authority." ' Courts have well established that "substantial abuse can be predicated
0*7
upon either lack of honesty or want of need."
While most courts have read "lack of good faith" into section 707(a) as a cause to
dismiss a Chapter 7 case, some courts differently held that if the bankruptcy court elected
to dismiss a Chapter 7 case with its inherent judicial power of punishing a bad faith
litigant, such action need not be taken pursuant to section 707(a) which authorizes
dismissals "for cause".
2. Structural deficiency in the dismissal provisions in Chapter 7
* Taking the two subsections of Section 707 as a whole, it seems that this section
contains a general provision in (a) and a more specific one in (b), but they are parallel to
each other and address the same subject, i.e., dismissal of a case. It also seems that the
later adoption of 707(b) is more like an expedient measure of Congress without an overall
consideration to the consistency of the statutory language in section 707 regarding the
court's role in dismissing a case, and whether good faith could be judicially imposed by
courts when determining the dismissal. From the most common sense, no one can
84
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Id.
86
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completely refuse that "substantial abuse" in 707(b) is not a kind reflection of "lack of
good faith" or "bad faith", which has been read by courts into 707(a) as a cause to dismiss
a Chapter 7 case. That means section 707(b) actually permits courts to use a good faith
requirement, even though a particularized one, to dismiss Chapter 7 cases involving
89
consumer debts, and thereby dismiss them voluntarily. In contrast, cases involving
business debts are only governed by 707(a), under which they can only be dismissed by
courts upon request of any interested party. Such inconsistencies between 707(a) and
707(b) could likely lead to different treatments to business debts and consumer debts in
Chapter 7, and as a result, different treatments to the creditors. Given the current structure
of the whole section of 707, Congress, on one hand, did not give any definition to either
"cause" in 707(a) or "substantial abuse" in 707(b); on the other hand, it explicitly
regarded "substantial abuse", most likely a specific good faith requirement, as a cause to
dismiss consumer debt cases, and kept silent on the general good faith filing requirement
in Chapter 7, did Congress really intend to treat consumer debts and business debts
differently in the liquidation proceeding?
Furthermore, the legislative histories of 707(a) and 707(b) also seem to be
contradictory. Although in the absence of statutory definition of "cause" in 707(a), the
legislative history of section 707(a) suggests that "this section does not contemplate,
however, that the ability of a debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part constitutes
adequate causes for dismissal. To permit dismissal on that ground would enact a non-
uniform mandatory Chapter 13, in lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy." Accordingly,
some courts held that in examining Chapter 7 debtors' good faith under 707(a), "any
consideration that goes to the debtor's financial means should be excluded, the court can
not make judgmental pronouncements that the debtor really should be paying his or her
89
11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1996) ("consumer debt" means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a
personal, family or household purpose).
90
H.R.Rep. No. 595, supra note 81, at 6336.
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debts rather than seeking refuge in bankruptcy liquidation."91 The "ability to pay"
seemingly has been rejected as a test for debtors' bad faith under section 707(a).
However, also in absence of any definition of "substantial abuse", the legislative history
of section 707(b) stated that "if a [consumer] debtor can meet his debts without difficulty
as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse."92 This statement
suggests that in considering what constitute "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7, the debtor's
financial ability could not be absolutely excluded as a factor. In reliance on this
statement, a majority of circuit courts which have ever dealt with the "substantial abuse"
issue have already concluded that the bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 7 case
under section 707(b) upon proof that a debtor could fund a confirmable Chapter 13 plan
or otherwise meet at least a significant portion of his or her debts.
93
Such deficiency in the statutory structure of section 707 and contradiction in the
legislative history of the two subsections raise a constitutional question of whether the
Bankruptcy Code violates the equal protection guarantee through such unjustified
inconsistent treatment of business debts and consumer debts. Although such
inconsistency is more understandable in light of the legislative history of Chapter 13,
which suggested that Congress intended to encourage consumer debtors whose debts are
up to a certain amount
95
to first resort to Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, therefore
those debtors who file Chapter 7 but actually are able to afford a Chapter 13 plan are
substantially abusing the relief provided by Chapter 7. However, in the absence of any
91
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further legislative suggestion, it can not be concluded that Congress really intended to
treat consumer debts and business debts differently in Chapter 7 in terms of dismissal; on
the contrary, such structural deficiency is a reflection of Congress' inability to define
"substantial abuse" or affirm "good faith" as a cause of dismissal of a Chapter 7 cases
which would encompass countervailing considerations.
3. Practical good faith tests in Chapter 7
In recognition of the flexibility and the subjectivity of good faith, courts
universally hold that good faith should at the very least require honest intentions on the
debtor's part. The issue of good faith must be determined on a case by case basis in
no
light of the totality of circumstances. The facts required to mandate dismissal based
upon a lack of good faith areas varied as the number of cases. In particular, "it requires
inquiry into any possible abuse of the provisions, purposes of bankruptcy law and into
whether the debtor genuinely needs the liberal protections afforded by the Bankruptcy
Code."
1
° However, with the lack of any authoritative guidance, courts developed various
practical tests to examine the debtor's good faith in Chapter 7.
(a) Simple reliance upon precedents and reorganization case law
As above mentioned, in the every beginning of liquidation case law, courts
imposed the good faith filing requirement simply because they imposed the same in
reorganization cases. Even after the In re Khan case, which first recognized "good faith
is an implicit jurisdictional requirement of a Chapter 7 case," some courts still used a
list of factors they developed in Chapter 1 1 and Chapter 13 cases to examine the Chapter
7 debtor. Those factors mainly included (l)frivolous purpose, absent any economic
reality; (2)lack of an honest and genuine desire to use the statutory process to effect a
97
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plan of reorganization; (3)use of bankruptcy as a device to further some sinister or
unworthy purpose; (4)abuse of the judicial process to delay creditors or escape the day of
reckoning in another court; (5)lack of real debt, creditors, assets in an ongoing business;
(6)lack of reasonable probability of successful reorganization. 102
Some other courts were even more conservative in analysing the good faith in
Chapter 7. They simply relied upon the precedent cases, especially relied upon the
instances of lack of good faith listed in those cases. As a court said,
[M]ost instances of dismissal for bad faith filing under 707(a) involve
concealment, misrepresentation, or unexplained transfers to place assets
beyond the reach of creditors. In absence of such evidence, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to conclude that no
wrongdoing warranting dismissal had occurred in this bankruptcy
103
action.
(b) Characteristic test/Smell test
Some courts gathered a growing number of "factors" or "characteristics" to
determine whether a particular case can be dismissed for lack of good faith. They held
that certain characteristics in a certain case, taking into account as a whole, should
amount to a lack of good faith. Such characteristic might be (1) concealed or
misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, (2) excessive and continued
expenditures, (3) lavish life-style, and (4) intention to avoid a large single debt based
upon conduct akin to fraud, misconduct, or gross negligence as in In re Zick; they also
might be (1) debtor's manipulations which reduced the creditors to one; (2) the debtor's
failure to make significant lifestyle adjustment or efforts to repay; (3) the fact that the
petition was filed clearly in response to the creditors' obtaining a judgment as in In re
102
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Studdard; or (1) one of few creditors in number; modest debt in amount relative to
assets or income; (2) lack of candor and completeness in debtor's statements, and
schedules; (3) improper or unexplained transfers, or absence, of debtor's pre-petition
assets; (4) multiple case filings or other extraordinary procedural gymnastics; and (5)
existence of a predominant dispute between debtor and a single creditor as in In re
Hammonds.
Some courts even used a so-called "smell test" to determine a debtor's good faith.
As they held, "the most important item in the courtroom and all too seldom used is the
judge's nose. Any trial judge will inevitably come to the conclusion on occasion that a
certain case or claim or defence has a bad ordor. Simply put, a matter smells. Some smell
so bad they stink," 107
(c) Limited definition-"for cause test"
Unlike the courts above, some courts were more realistic and prudent in the use of
good faith doctrine in liquidation cases. They pondered with substantial justification
whether the amorphous concept of good faith has any applicability to a request for
108
dismissal under section 707(a). They expressed concern that the opened-ended use of
bad faith to dismiss Chapter 7 cases was improper, and they also worried that the bad
faith inquiry would be employed as a loose canon which was to be pointed in the
direction of a debtor whose values did not coincide precisely with those of the court.
By criticizing the irresponsible reliance upon the good faith requirement for the
reorganization cases, they believed that good faith in Chapter 7 should be defined in the
Chapter 7 context, because "where debtors surrender all non-exempt assets to a trustee for
liquidation in Chapter 7 cases, as opposed to Chapter 1 1 and Chapter 13 cases where the
105
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debtor normally remains in possession of non-exempt assets, a different level of conduct
may be required for debtors in a Chapter 7 case." 110 They also believed that "human
nature and prevailing social mores are such that individual Chapter 7 debtors almost
never file without anticipating and intending their cases to have a legal and economic
effect on their pre-petition creditors."
111
The termination of the creditors' pre-petition
legal rights to enforce their claims against the debtor undoubtedly is detrimental to
creditors. There should be a real distinction between Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 1 or Chapter
1 3 cases as to what constitutes good faith. Therefore, these courts, insisted that in any
event, any concept of good faith should "embrace only the narrow concepts of fraudulent
misrepresentations or serious non-disclosures of material facts. It should not address
elements which are properly dealt with under separate provisions of the Code, such as
substantial abuse, which is dealt with exclusively in section 707(b)." The case should
be dismissed just "for cause". The actual "cause" to dismiss a Chapter 7 case should be
"a large category of conduct which expressly violates Code provisions, such as failure of
the debtor to perform its prescribed duties, or certain acts, conduct or omissions on the
part of the debtor which may result in the total denial of discharge in a Chapter 7 case.
(d) "Frustrate bankruptcy purposes" test
Some courts urged a more narrow and cautious approach to interpret good faith in
Chapter 7 cases. Represented by In re Khan, and In re Huckfeldt, those courts held
that bad faith under 707(a) should be limited to extreme misconduct falling outside the
purview of more specific Code provisions, because "the real question about good faith
110
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111
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should be whether the debtor is in bankruptcy with an intent to receive the sort of relief
that Congress had available to petitioners under the chapter in question, subject to, of
course, any statutory limitations on the extent of that the duties that Congress imposes on
debtors as the cost of receiving such relief."
117
Bad faith might be found when the debtor
had a frivolous, noneconomic motive for filing a bankruptcy petition, when there was a
sinister or unworthy purpose or when there was an abuse of the judicial process. Merely
taking advantages of its legal rights is not by itself, sufficient to support a finding a bad
118
faith. Lack of good faith should be evidenced by "a pervasive and orchestrated effort
on the part of the debtor to obtain the benefits of a bankruptcy filing while at the same
time intentionally and fraudulently taking action to avoid any of the detriments." 119 Such
an effort might involve an intention to file solely to interpose the automatic stay against
pending litigation or foreclosure, without a concomitant acceptance of the statutory duties
of financial disclosure, cooperation with the trustee, and surrender of non-exempt
assets. It also would be prompted by a vindictive motivation to use bankruptcy solely
121
as a "scorched-earth" tactic against a pressing creditor or opponent in litigation.
Additionally, lack of good faith in filing would also involve manifested dishonesty
toward a legal tribunal, which could not only be the Bankruptcy Court, but also could be
another court that had jurisdiction over the debtor in a pre-petition proceeding, and from
whose jurisdiction the debtor was seeking refuge in bankruptcy. Credible evidence that
the debtor is seeking to hide from the adjudication of contempt in a nonbankruptcy court,
without justification in the form of true financial distress, would support a finding of bad
faith in filing.
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Under this test, the good faith filing requirement can be read into 707(a) or
directly used by the court in performing its judicial power. 123
(e) Objection: no implicit good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7
Although some courts began to accept the narrower and restricted good faith test,
no one had openly questioned the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7, until In re
Landes, in which the court criticized all the practical tests used by the earlier cases and
held that there was no implicit good faith requirement in Chapter 7 filings.
As the court held in that case, the characteristic test, referred to as "multi-pronged
125
test," was poorly designed to attempt to focus on a series of often difficult and
irrelevant inquiries and did not provide any guidelines regarding the weight of different
factors. The prongs of a multi-pronged approach themselves are a moving target. 127
Meanwhile, neither could the smell test be helpful because smell is an adaptive sense.
"What smells bad to one person might be perfume to another.. .It is.. .simply the ultimate
1 ?R
surrender to moralistic selectivism and an abdication of principled decision making."
In the instant case, where the debtor did not have large income or assets of any significant
value, the debtor had made a significant lifestyle adjustment, the debtor was not denied
previous discharge and was not accused of omitting anything material from his schedules,
and there were significant numbers of creditors on debtor's schedules, the Chapter 7 case
would not be dismissed on creditor's motion under the multi-pronged test for the good
faith filing.
As for the "for cause" test, the court held that this test was focused on the debtor's
putative violations of the Code provisions. In the instant case, there really were some
evidences of the debtor's conduct in a pre-petition case which evinced the debtor's
123
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violations of the Code provisions, 130 but the fact that "many individuals file bankruptcy
as a result of liability from heinous pre-petition debts which violate both civil and
criminal law" could not necessarily exclude such "bad persons" from the benefits of
bankruptcy.
Further, as the movants in that case attempted to establish that the debtor filed the
bankruptcy case for the sole purpose of staying the state court proceedings, the court, in
analysing the "frustrate bankruptcy purpose" test, held that although this test was based
upon the rationale that the "real" purpose of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is discharge of debts
and that such a filing for the sole purpose of obtaining relief from the stay should be
132
forbidden, as "the Code provides what it provides and debtors are free to take from it
whatever benefits of which they can avail themselves," it was not appropriate to
determine one benefit as more proper than another. The automatic stay in a Chapter 7
is temporary at best, it could not be a prime motivating factor in the debtor's filing.
Although this court made very good points on the shortcomings of different good
faith tests and denied the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7, it failed to make a
completely persuasive and logical conclusion. At the beginning of the case, it held that
its analysis of Chapter 7 good faith requirement was motivated by its rejection of good
faith filing requirement in Chapter 13 cases. It did not sufficiently analyze the
characteristics of Chapter 7 proceeding itself, instead, it focused on each practical good
faith test and applied every test to the specific facts of that instant case. As the court could
not find enough facts to fit each test, it concluded that all such tests were inapplicable,
therefore the good faith filing requirement should also be inapplicable. Such conclusion,
130
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which had a general applicability but was drawn from some specific facts, had logical
weakness.
III. Summary
1. Necessity of the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7
As stated in Chapter I, the modern bankruptcy concept includes two facets: fresh
start of debtors and equitable distribution to creditors, which are realized by way of the
procedural or substantial alteration of debtors' obligations to their creditors. In a
liquidation proceeding, a debtor's fresh start is obtained from the immediate termination
of its obligations to creditors by surrendering all non-exempt property as of the filling of
a Chapter 7 petition. However, such fresh start, at the same time, should be balanced by
the fair treatment to creditors.
In a liquidation proceeding, the amount of claims to be realized largely depends
upon the amount of the debtor's non-exempt property at the time of filing Chapter 7
petition, without any consideration of its future income. From the perspective of the
debtor, the liquidation of its non-exempt property, for the one who has overburdened
debts without any ability to maintain his relationship with creditors, would be really a
fresh start, in such a situation its creditors have to face the reality to get their better-than-
nothing distribution from the limited assets of the debtors; however, for the one who is
able to keep performing its obligations with its future income in a prolonged period but
intends to get rid of those obligations by liquidation, it may possibly cause unfair
treatments to its creditors. To balance these two facets, it is necessary for the bankruptcy
court to exclude such non-needy debtors from taking advantage of the liquidation
proceeding. Congress has expressed this concern regarding consumer debtors when
adopting 707(b) without mentioning business debtors. Although the Bankruptcy Code
does not require the debtor's insolvency or debt amounts when filing Chapter 7, the
137
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bankruptcy court, when accepting a liquidation petition, should not forget whether the
debtor deserves the possible relief granted by Chapter 7, and whether its creditors can be
treated fairly and equitably because of such relief.
However, because of the special characteristics of liquidation in contrast with
reorganization, the debtor's good faith when filing Chapter 7 case should be
correspondingly different. It is reasonable for some courts to make the holding that as a
liquidation proceeding contains extreme alteration of the relationships between the debtor
and its creditors, a different level of conduct may be required for a Chapter 7 debtor. 138
Courts should not examine the debtor's good faith in filing Chapter 7 simply with the
tests employed in reorganization proceedings, neither should they just use the smell test,
which is too indefinite and may lead to different results in different noses. This notion
does not mean in the liquidation proceeding, the debtor's good faith will not be required,
rather, it should have its special meaning in the liquidation context.
Some commentators argued that the absence of the good faith filing requirement
for the liquidation proceeding in the whole bankruptcy legislation history was a deliberate
effort of Congress. The good faith filing requirement should be applicable in Chapter
1 1 or 13 reorganization proceedings but not in Chapter 7. They made this argument with
the support of the dismissal provisions in Chapter 1 1 and 13, under both of which courts
may dismiss a Chapter 1 1 or 13 case "for cause" or convert it into Chapter 7. It is well
established that "filing in bad faith" can be used by courts as a cause to dismiss or convert
a Chapter 11 or 13 case.
1
If a Chapter 11 or 13 case was dismissed or converted to
Chapter 7 for "filing in bad faith", it would be ironic and contradictory that it could be
converted into Chapter 7 if a Chapter 7 petition is also required to be filed in good
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faith. This argument can not sufficiently demonstrate the non-necessity of the good
faith filing requirement for Chapter 7, on the contrary, it exactly illustrated that the
meaning of "good faith" in Chapter 7 should be different from that in Chapter 1 1 and 13.
At present, the legislation and the case law development for Chapter 7 are in a
quite confusing situation. Until either Congress or the Supreme Court make any statement
for the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7, or for the inconsistencies of the
legislative histories and statutory languages between section 707(a) and 707(b), or for the
diversified standards used by courts to dismiss Chapter 7 cases, bankruptcy courts should
be allowed to use their judicial discretion to protect the bankruptcy proceeding from
being abused by those bad faith debtors. However, in the course of using such judicial
discretion, they should, on one hand, remain the implied good faith requirement for
Chapter 7 filings in order to weed out the undeserving debtors; on the other hand, apply
this requirement in the limited scope, in order to prevent harsh treatment to the "honest
but unfortunate debtors" who seek liquidation as their last resort.
2. Relationship between the Judicially-made good faith filing requirement and the
statutory provisions of Chapter 7
Honestly, the Bankruptcy Code has structured remedies for creditors to balance
the debtor's use of the liquidation proceeding, such as denial or revocation of discharge,
exception of discharge, or disallowance of a claimed exemption. Such remedies can
prevent debtors from obtaining discharge through their fraud or other wrongdoing, and
actually has the similar effect as dismissing a case for lack of good faith. In this sense, it
seems that the Bankruptcy Code does require the debtor to act in good faith in order to
gain a fresh start, but it particularizes its expectation to such good faith into its specific
provisions. Without the good faith filing requirement as a threshold consideration,
sometimes the debtor can also be excluded from discharge. As the Khan court held, in
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creating more circumscribed remedies, "Congress clearly contemplated that a bankruptcy
case could proceed to dispense remedies to creditors, notwithstanding the debtor's past
commission of certain proscribed acts that contravened public policy. Without the
detriment of losing the centralized remedy of administration of assets that dismissal
would otherwise cause." Therefore, the remedy of dismissal for lack of good faith was
prompted to "maintain the balance of remedies in bankruptcy," it would occur "only if
the estate contained no non-exempt assets or rights of recovery that had any significant
value, and if there were no other compelling need to keep the debtor under the authority
of the Bankruptcy Court for investigative or administrative purposes."
146
This holding
reasonably revealed that when the bankruptcy court applied the good faith filing
requirement at least in a Chapter 7 situation, it should be used as supplemental to the
statutory provisions covered by the Bankruptcy Code, which also have the function of
monitoring the debtor's conduct in the Chapter 7 process. However, those statutory
provisions can not necessarily supersede the judicially-made good faith requirement or
make it meaningless, because in the actual judicial process, case circumstances might be
incredibly various and diversified, and the creditors' interest might not always be
balanced by such stipulated remedies. The good faith filing requirement could be used by
courts to make up the statutory vacancies which, without any support of courts, may lead
to any deviation from the legislative purposes or inadequate function of the Bankruptcy
Code.
The Khan court's narrower approach to interpret good faith in Chapter 7, which
was concluded by the Landes court as "frustrate bankruptcy purpose" test , so far could
be the most acceptable good faith test. Under this test, dismissing a Chapter 7 case for
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"lack of good faith" should be limited to extreme misconduct falling outside the purview
of the more specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
148
3. Limiting good faith to "substantial abuse"
The "frustrate bankruptcy purpose test", to some extent, can reflect the generality
of the debtor's good faith in filing every bankruptcy petitions. Only using this test
seeming can not sufficiently reflect the special characteristics of Chapter 7. Currently, as
Congress permits "substantial abuse" to be the ground of dismissal of a consumer debt
case under 707(b), which is undoubtedly a specific reflection of "lack of good faith",
correspondingly, when dismissing a case pursuant to 707(a) for "lack of good faith", such
lack of good faith can be interpreted to "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 relief. Such
interpretation may help narrow the gap between case law under 707(a) and 707(b).
4. Reassessment of the "Ability to Pay" test
As analyzed above, the "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 is inevitably related to
the debtor's financial circumstances. The "ability to pay" test which was rejected by
Congress in adopting 707(a) should now be reassessed. Why Congress rejected the
"ability to pay" test as a consideration to dismiss a case under 707(a) was a fear that
"non-uniform mandatory Chapter 13 would be created," which means consumer
debtors might be forced to file Chapter 1 3 petitions. But that was not directly related to
business debtors, and it did not explicitly suggest that the "Ability to Pay" test should be
excluded in dismissing a business debt case. Since a business debtor resorting to
liquidation could be in the situation that "there is no going concern to preserve, no
employees to protect, and there is no hope of rehabilitation," when it files the Chapter 7
case, its financial situation should definitely be a consideration of its good faith.
Moreover, when adopting 707(b), Congress further suggested that "if a debtor can meet
148
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his debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a
substantial abuse,"
152
which at least recognized that the "ability to pay" or the financial
situation should be a consideration to dismiss a Chapter 7 consumer debt case. Without
any other suggestions, this statement implicitly repudiated Congress' own rejection of the
"ability to pay" test when adopting 707(a). As a matter of fact, a majority of courts had
already used the "ability to pay" test in dismissing consumer debt case under 707(b),
which has already been inconsistent with the legislative history of 707(a). Unless
Congress or the Supreme Court otherwise declares, the debtor's financial resources, or
the ability to pay debts in later 3 or 5 years, could be permitted as a consideration by the
court in dismissing a Chapter 7 case, no matter what kind of debts are involved.
Another issue which is necessary for the reassessment of the "ability to pay" test
is whether the dismissal of a Chapter 7 case involving consumer debts for "lack of good
faith" might directly constitute a mandatory Chapter 13 filing. Actually this issue had
been solved by Congress itself when it adopted 707(b), under which the consumer debt
Chapter 7 case can only be dismissed by the court voluntarily in stead of by request of
any party in interest. Designed by the Bankruptcy Code the non-mandatory Chapter 13
means no involuntary filing can be made under Chapter 13 and no involuntary conversion
to Chapter 7. Creditors shall not force their debtors to go into the reorganization
proceeding by filing involuntary bankruptcy; the court shall not convert a Chapter 7
case involving consumer debts to Chapter 13 without the debtor's own request, and vice
versa,*
54
while a Chapter 7 case involving business debts can be converted into Chapter
1 1 either by the court upon request of the debtor itself or any party in interest. With
such statutory restrictions, the only way to deal with a Chapter 7 case involving consumer
debts on the ground of "substantial abuse" is to dismiss, but it does not necessarily mean
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the debtor will be forced to file a Chapter 13. On the contrary, such restrictions implicitly
requires the debtor to select the bankruptcy relief which is most appropriate to its own
financial situation.
5. The bankruptcy court's power to dismiss a Chapter 7 case involving business
debts
Limiting the meaning of the "lack of good faith" to "substantial abuse" in Chapter
7 and recognizing the "ability-to-pay" test in Chapter 7 cases for both consumer and
business debtors can also help alleviate the constitutional equal protection challenge
triggered by the statutory inconsistencies between 707(a) and 707(b). 156 To further such
equal protection, the bankruptcy court should be permitted to use its inherent judicial
power to dismiss a Chapter 7 case involving business debts sua sponte, whether by
reading "lack of good faith" into section 707(a) or not. Such inherent judicial power,
actually has been recognized by the Bankruptcy Code in section 105(a), which provides
that "the Court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and "no provisions of providing for
the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be constructed to preclude the court
from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate
1 57
to enforce or implement court order or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process."
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CHAPTER IV
GOOD FAITH IN REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS
I. Two Good Faith Requirements
Unlike in Chapter 7, Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code which
respectively govern the reorganization of business debtors and consumer debtors, 158
explicitly stipulates good faith as one requirement for confirmation of the debtor's
reorganization plan. The relevant provisions in the two Chapters are actually identical,
i.e., the Bankruptcy Court shall confirm a plan only if "the plan has been proposed in
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." 1 Without any further statutory
guidance for the definition as well as application of the good faith doctrine in such
situation, courts have developed various rules to discern the debtor's good faith when it
proposes its reorganization plan; on the other hand, although Congress deleted the
explicit good faith filing requirement in the reorganization proceedings when adopting
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, all courts have been holding that good faith should still
be a threshold requirement for the debtor's filing of a reorganization petition, both in
Chapter 1 1 and Chapter 13. A bad faith filing could be dismissed by courts. Thus, in the
reorganization process, the good faith doctrine actually acts as a policing mechanism at
the two critical links, namely, filing of petition and proposal of plan.
158
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 1 101-1 174 (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1996).
i9
1 1 U.S.C. § 1 129 (a)(3) (1996), 1 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1996).
160
See supra Chapter II.
37
38
The debtor's repayment plan is the essential part of a reorganization proceeding,
by which the debtor can perform its prepetition obligations owing to creditors in an
adjusted manner. As both Chapter 11 and 13 have already had a statutory good faith
requirement for the debtor when it proposes its reorganization plan, and the violation of
such requirement will result in the denial of confirmation of the plan or the dismissal of
the whole case, hence the question arises whether it remains necessary for courts to
judicially impose an extra good faith filing requirement? May it lead to harsh treatment to
debtors? This question could be explained in light of the procedural rules for Chapter 1
1
and 13. First of all, when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an order for relief shall be
issued by the bankruptcy court. Under Chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
is permitted to file its plan together with its Chapter 1 1 petition or file the plan until
120 days after the date of the order for relief, in case of a small business debtor, it can
file the plan until 100 days but within 160 days after the date of the order for relief.
Furthermore, on request of a party in interest, such 1 20 days or 1 00 days can be increased
by courts after notice and hearing.
166
Since the debtor's Chapter 11 petition and the
reorganization plan may be filed simultaneously or separately, there could likely be a
certain time span between the filing of petition and the filing of plan.
Unlike Chapter 1 1 , there are no counterpart procedural provisions for the timing
of filing a Chapter 13 plan in the Bankruptcy Code but in the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, under which the debtor may file a Chapter 1 3 plan simultaneously
with the petition; if a plan is not filed with the petition, it should be filed within 1 5 days
thereafter, and such time can not be further extended except for cause shown and on
161
11 U.S.C.§ 11 12(b)(5) (1996); 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(4) (1996).
162
1 1 U.S.C. § 301 (Voluntary cases) (The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title
constitutes an order for relief under such chapter).
163
11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1996).
164
1 1 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1996).
165
11 U.S.C. §1121 (e)(l)(2) (1996).
166
1 1 U.S.C. § 1 121(d), (e)(3)(A) (1996).
39
notice as the court may direct. 167 Further suggested by the legislative history, "the debtor
will usually file his plan with the petition commencing the case, but the bill gives him the
opportunity, if he is pressed into Chapter 1 3 in a hurry to avoid aggressive creditors, to
develop and file his plan after the commencement of the case."
168
Additionally the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure explicitly authorize the
court to examine the debtor's good faith in proposing the plan. However, such
examination shall be subject to an objection from any party in interest. The "lack of good
faith" challenge for the plan under both Chapter 1 1 and Chapter 13 shall be brought up
only by any party in interest objecting to the plan, and "if no objection is timely filed, the
court may determine that the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law without receiving evidence on such issues."
At this juncture one might conclude that in a reorganization proceeding, any good
faith issue can be dealt with on confirmation of the plan, there is no need to input an extra
good faith requirement to examining the debtor's filing of the petition. It might be
feasible when the petition and the plan are filed at the same time. However, in most
Chapter 1 1 cases, the debtor files its plan after a few months of its filing Chapter 1 1 . If
the petition is filed in bad faith, any party in interest generally will not be afforded
sufficient protection if the inquiry into the debtor's good faith is delayed until the time of
confirmation. As the filing of a petition prevents any efforts of creditors from resorting to
foreclosing or suing for damages or enforcing judgments, creditors might be prejudiced if
they have to wait to raise the good faith issue until confirmation of the plan, while the
debtor might be given opportunity to conceal, impair or waste assets or otherwise defraud
creditors if the good faith inquiry to its filing is postponed. Also, both creditors and the
debtor may have to incur additional expenses for a bad faith filing if it is not examined or
167
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dismissed until confirmation of the plan. Even though in Chapter 13, where the filing of
the petition and the filing of the plan can take place simultaneously or in close temporal
proximity, the judicially made good faith filing requirement should not thereby be
eliminated because they are still likely in two different stages. "If the filing of a petition
involves a blatant abuse ofjudicial process, the court need not wait until the confirmation
hearing to provide a remedy."
170
As a matter of fact, the two good faith requirements may lead to different legal
consequences. Comparatively, the good faith requirement for filing of the petition is a
broader one focusing on the debtor's conduct in the initiation of the whole proceeding,
the finding of lack of good faith in filing a Chapter 1 1 or 1 3 petition may directly lead to
the dismissal or conversion of the case, which means the termination of the whole
proceeding. On the other hand, the good faith requirement for proposal of the plan under
both sections 1 129(a) and 1325(a) more narrowly focus on the debtor's conduct in filing
the plan. In confirmation of a plan, a bankruptcy court's rejection of a plan for lack of
good faith does not necessarily lead to dismissal or conversion of the case, the debtor may
be given another chance to modify the plan. Thus the finding of a lack of good faith in
structuring of a particular plan may block confirmation of that plan, but the petition itself
may still viable absent a showing that the entire petition was filed in bad faith.
Therefore, in terms of both procedural and substantial features of reorganization
proceedings, the judicially-made good faith filing requirement has its own value for both
creditors and debtors, and should exist together with the statutory good faith requirement
for proposal of the plan in those proceedings.
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II. Good faith in Chapter 11
1. Introduction to Chapter 11 relief
Chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy Code was originally designed for the reorganization
business debtors. Although the Supreme Court used to hold that Congress did not
intend to absolutely exclude individual debtors from filing Chapter 1 l,
175
the structure and
procedures of Chapter 1 1 make it more appropriate for business debtors. Unlike an
individual, more social and economic interests are involved in the operation of a business,
including those of creditors, employees, owners, and even the government. In lieu of
reorganization, the liquidation of a business means that workers will lose their jobs,
resulting in financial and emotional stress to themselves as well as to their families.
Secured creditors may find that the liquidation value of the business is insufficient to
repay more than a small fraction of their debts, while unsecured creditors might get
nothing; If creditors are not paid in full in the liquidation, the shareholders, partners or
other kinds of owners of the business will be left with nothing. All of such consequences
will, on the other hand, adversely influence and burden the whole society. With the
availability of Chapter 1 1 , when a company has negative cash flow, or is behind debt
repayments and pressured by creditors' debt collection endeavors but still has greater
going concern value than the liquidation value, it can resort to be protected by Chapter
1 1 . Under the administration of the bankruptcy court, it can keep operating its business in
order to maintain or increase the going concern value, adjust its relationship with
creditors without any pressure from other nonbankruptcy debt collection measures, and
repay them over a prolonged time period. As suggested by Congress, the goal of "a
business reorganization case, unlike a [Chapter 7] liquidation case, is to restructure the
174
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business's finance so that it may continue to operate." 176 From the perspective of a
corporate debtor, such a proceeding is much more beneficial to its employees, managers
and owners and, if it can operate well with increasing going concern value, it will also be
much more beneficial to creditors than liquidation.
The good faith doctrine has played an active role in the business reorganization
proceeding both before and after the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to the
adoption of the Code, a substantial body of case law had required good faith in the filing
of any reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Act, whether or not such a requirement
was contained in the statutory language. After the Bankruptcy Code was adopted,
1 78 1 7Q
courts, beginning from In re Victory Constr. Co. and In re Little Creek, held that
"every bankruptcy statute since 1898 has incorporated literally, or by judicial
interpretation, a standard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution, and
1 80
confirmation of a bankruptcy proceedings." As they established, the good faith
standard, as an implicit prerequisite to the filing or continuation of a proceeding under
Chapter 1 1 of the Bankruptcy Code, "furthers the balancing process between the interests
of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws
and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a
1 S 1
bankruptcy." It could prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process by debtors whose
overriding motive is to delay creditors without benefiting them in any way or to achieve
reprehensible purposes. It could also protect the jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy
courts by rendering their powerful equitable weapons available only to those debtors and
1 82
creditors with "clear hands".
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These two cases have been regarded as milestones for the judicially-made good
faith filing requirement under Chapter 11 in the post-Code era. The principles they
established have been widely cited by later cases. So far almost no court has questioned
those principles.
2. Application of good faith filing requirement
In recognition of such judicially-made good faith filing requirement under
Chapter 1 1 , courts have relied upon several alternative grounds to impose such
requirement, when using it to dismiss or convert a Chapter 1 1 case or lift the automatic
stay.
a. Dismissal of a Chapter 1 1 case under Section 305(a)
According to section 305(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may dismiss a bankruptcy case at any time if the interest of creditors and the
debtors would be better served by such dismissal. The legislative history of section
305(a) suggested that "there are cases in which it would be appropriate for a court to
1 84
decline jurisdiction." This provision actually gives a court some discretion to dismiss a
case, and its underlying purpose is actually consistent with the inherent judicial power of
the court. As a result, some courts have attempted to establish that the presence of lack of
good faith in filing the Chapter 1 1 case should be an appropriate instance for declining
jurisdiction under Section 305(a), because adjudication of such a petition would
constitute an abuse of the judicial proceeding and the judicial integrity of the court.
Section 305(a) allows the bankruptcy court to act sua sponte to dismiss a Chapter
1 1 case filed in lack of good faith, however, the court has to follow the statutory
1 StrS
requirement that the dismissal is best for the interests of both creditors and the debtor.
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This, in some ways is a block to the implementation of this section, since it is rare when
dismissal of a petition for lack of good faith will be in the debtor's best interest.
b. Dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 1 1 case under section 1 1 12(b)
There is another provision in the Bankruptcy Code specifically for the dismissal
of a Chapter 11 case, i.e., section 1112 (b), which has been used by courts to input the
judicially-made good faith filing requirement to dismiss a case. Like Section 707(a), the
same "for cause" language appears in Section 1 1 12(b), under which the court may,
[0]n request of a party in interest or the United States trustee or
bankruptcy administrator, and after notice and hearing, convert a case
under this Chapter to a case under Chapter 7 or may dismiss a case under
this Chapter, whichever as in the best interest of creditors and the estate,
for cause, including:
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within
any time fixed by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a
request made for additional time for filing another plan or a
modification of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1 1 44 of
this title, and denial of confirmation of another plan or a
modified plan under section 1 129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed
plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition
specified in the plan;
(10) non-payment of any fees or charges required under chapter
123 of title 28.
187
The legislative history of Section 1112(b) suggested that "the list [of section
1 1 12(b)] is not exhaustive. The court will be able to consider other factors as they arise,
and to use its equitable powers to reach an appropriate result in individual cases." This
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statement, as well as the rules of construction in the Bankruptcy Code affirming that
i on
"include" or "including" is not limited, enable courts to use their judicial discretion to
decide what could constitute a "cause" for dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 1 1 case.
As the court in In re Victory Constr.Co. held, "cause" is any reason cognizable to the
equity power and conscience of the court as constituting an abuse of the bankruptcy
process. The debtor's lack of good faith in filing a Chapter 11 petition, has been
accepted as the most prominent judicially-made "cause".
An overwhelming number of courts have read the good faith filing requirement
into this section. However, this section only permits courts to consider the debtor's good
faith in filing when a party of interest timely brings up such a notion. Sometimes it
seems inadequate to provide complete protection to bad faith petitions,
c. Lifting the automatic stay under Section 362(d)
The automatic stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is one of the
fundamental protection procedures for the debtor. By filing a bankruptcy petition under
any Chapter, the automatic stay becomes effective immediately and stops all collection
efforts, all harassment and all foreclosure actions. ' Without such stay, the debtor's
petition is nearly impotent.
Section 362(d) permits relief from the stay. On request of a party in interest, the
bankruptcy court can grant relief from the stay "for cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest." Without any statutory
definition or explanation to "for cause" here and, based upon the same rule of
construction the word "including", a few courts have held that lack of good faith in filing
Chapter 1 1 petition constitutes a sufficient cause to allow relief from the stay. Like
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section 1 1 12(b), section 362(d) does not allow the court to act sua sponte, and can not be
used to dismiss a case. Although it does not sanction dismissal of an entire case by
providing relief from the stay, it still has the effect of enforcing a good faith requirement.
Normally, the party in interest brings up the motion to lift the stay under section 362(d)
and to dismiss the case under 1 1 12(b) at the same time and on the same ground that the
petition is filed in bad faith.
d. Procedural rule for any bankruptcy filing
Some courts also support the good faith filing requirement with certain procedural
rules in the bankruptcy courts which they think bears out the power implicit in the
Code. Under the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedures,
[E]very petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a case
under the [Bankruptcy]Code on the behalf of a party. ..shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record [or by the party, if the party is not represented
by an attorney]...The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a
certificate that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best
of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay or to increase the cost of
,... .• 196
litigation.
Suggested by its legislative history, this provision was meant to "discourage
dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening
frivolous claims..." In turn, the courts ruled that it necessarily implied that all
198
bankruptcy pleadings, including Chapter 1 1 petitions, must be filed in good faith.
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e. Equitable power of bankruptcy courts
As a bankruptcy court has the powers of a court of equity,
199
another way in
which it can indirectly impose the good faith filing requirement lies in its power to use
equitable doctrines and principles to dismiss a case when its jurisdiction is improperly
invoked. Also, section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the courts to issue any
order, process or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy
201
Code. Because a bad faith petition constitutes an imposition on the court's jurisdiction,
it is subject to dismissal based on equitable principles such as lex nemini operatur
iniquum, nemini facit injuham or the "clean hands" doctrine. With such equitable
powers, the court is able to discretionarily dismiss an improper petition without any of the
restrictions imposed by section 305(a) or 1 1 12(b).
f. Arguable possible base
In addition to the above-mentioned bases, some commentators suggested that
there could be other possible bases to impose an implicit good faith filing requirement.
Such suggestion came about on the basis of the structure of the Bankruptcy Code itself.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, creditors can file a involuntary Chapter 1 1 petition to force
20S
their debtor to come into the reorganization process, while the court can dismiss an
involuntary petition other than on consent of all petitioners and the debtor, and may grant
judgment in favor of the debtor to recover damages against those creditors who file such
involuntary petition in bad faith.
206
This means an involuntary Chapter 11 filing by
creditors can be dismissed by the court sua sponte if it is filed in bad faith, implicitly,
creditors are required to file an involuntary petition in good faith. There is no parallel
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requirement in the Bankruptcy Code for the debtor's voluntary filing, so it could be
arguable that it would be confusing if the Bankruptcy Code allows the bad faith voluntary
petition to pass through the entrance of Chapter 1 1 but provides means to attack the bad
faith involuntary filing. Although it indicates that Congress adopted such provision for
policy reasons purporting to prevent the debtor from being dragged into a bankruptcy
proceeding by such bad faith creditors, it does not necessarily mean when a debtor files a
case under the same Chapter, its bad faith could be allowed or tolerated, even though the
Bankruptcy Code is especially designed for their financial fresh start.
3. Practical tests for good faith filing requirement in Chapter 11
As a judicially made rule, the debtor's good faith in filing a Chapter 1 1 petition
has been examined by courts with diversified standards. As an amorphous notion, good
faith has been thought to be defined largely by factual inquiry; By studying Chapter 1
1
cases, it could be found that how to define good faith also depends upon how the courts
understand the legislative purposes and objectives of Chapter 11.
a. Totality of Circumstances Test
207
Represented by In re Little Creek, some courts employed the "Totality of
Circumstances" test to probe the debtor's good faith when filing the Chapter 11
petition. They believed that "determining the debtor's good faith in filing its Chapter
11 petition depends largely upon the bankruptcy court's on-the-spot evaluation of the
debtor's financial condition, motives, and the local financial realities," and findings of
lack of good faith in proceedings based upon 362(d) or 1 1 12(b) should be predicated on
the totality of circumstances involving "certain recurring but non-exclusive patterns,
210
which are based on a conglomerate of factors rather than on any single datum."
207
In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F. 2d 1068 (1986).
208
Id., at 1072.
209
Id.
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Id, see also In re SB Properties, Inc., 185 B.R. 198 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
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However, so far this "Totality of Circumstances" test has been applied by courts
particularly to deal with a typical kind of Chapter 1 1 cases, which is called "single asset"
cases. A majority of such cases have been established to be filed in bad faith, and the
courts therefore granted dismissal of the case or the relief from the stay.
211
The typical
features of such cases include that the debtor has only one asset, such as a tract of
undeveloped or developed real property, which is encumbered by secured creditors' liens.
There are generally no or few employees, little or no cash flow, and no available sources
of income to sustain a plan of reorganization and to make adequate protection payments
pursuant to relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, there are only a
few, if any, unsecured creditors whose claims are relatively small. The property has
usually been posted for foreclosure because of arrearages on the debt and the debtor has
been unsuccessful in defending actions against the foreclosure in state court;
alternatively, the debtor and one creditor may have proceeded to a stand-still in state
court litigation, and the debtor has lost or has been required to post a bond which it can
not afford. Under those circumstances, bankruptcy offers the only possibility of
212
forestalling loss of the property.
Meanwhile, the Totality of Circumstances test has also been used to deal with
some extreme single-asset cases, which are called the "new debtor syndrome". In such
situation, the debtor is an one-asset entity created or revitalized on the eve of foreclosure
211 Humble Place Joint Venture v. Fory {In re Humble Place Joint Venture), 936 F. 2d 814 (1991); Carolin
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(N.D. 111. 1986); In re Campus Housing Dev., Inc., 124 B.R. 867 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991); In re Don
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to isolate the insolvent property and its creditors, or a shell corporation which is
created solely for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition.
214
Dealing with such cases, courts hold that, the purpose of Chapter 11
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by providing them
with breathing space to return to a viable business.
15
Under factual circumstances of the
single-asset cases or new-debtor syndrome, the debtor's resort to the protection of the
bankruptcy laws is not proper "because there was no going concern to preserve, there
were no employees to protect, and there was no hope of rehabilitation" As "there is not
a potentially viable business in place worthy of protection and rehabilitation," neither
the bankruptcy court nor the creditors should be subject to the costs and delays of a
bankruptcy proceedings under such circumstances. The good faith doctrine here
concerns the underlying question whether reorganization is a proper course of action for
such debtors. Dismissing the case for lack of good faith in filing is not imposed
principally as a sanction of bad intentions or harassing behavior; instead, it should be a
legal determination that the debtors are not entitled to the remedies provided by Chapter
1 1 . For the "new debtor syndrome" cases, the bankruptcy petition is more likely
unnecessary because it constitutes an apparent abuse of the bankruptcy process and is
offensive to the integrity of the bankruptcy systems, as well as an infringement of the
220
nonbankruptcy rights of creditors.
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Based upon the situations normally involved in the single-asset cases, courts
developed a laundry list consisting of a set of factors to determine whether a case had
221
been filed in bad faith. These factors may include but are not limited to (1) the debtor
has one asset, in which the debtor might not hold the legal title; (2) the pre-petition
conduct of the debtor has been improper; (3) there are only a few unsecured creditors
whose claims are small in relation to the claims of the secured creditors; (4) the debtor's
property is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of arrearages on the debt; (5) the
debtor's financial problems involve essentially a dispute between the debtor and the
secured creditors which can be solved in the pending state court action; (6) the timing of
the debtor's filing evidences an intent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of the
debtor's secured creditors to enforce their rights; (7) the debtor has no ongoing business;
222
and (8) the lack of possibility of reorganization.
In applying such test, the courts insisted that although characterized in a very
descriptive way, all factors should be considered as a whole, and the satisfaction of one
factor can not sufficiently amount to bad faith. For example, some cases suggested that
there was bad faith giving cause for dismissal, if the debtor was involved in a dispute
with secured creditors that could be resolved in state court, and the timing of the debtor's
223
bankruptcy filing indicated an attempt to avoid state court adjudication. However, the
timing of any bankruptcy filing may be relevant to determining whether the debtor acted
to delay creditors unnecessarily, but there is nothing improper in a debtor's thwarting
state court collection proceedings by filing a Chapter 1 1 petition, as long as
reorganization was both needed and feasible.
221
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As designed for the typical "single-asset" and "new debtor syndrome" cases,
obviously the "Totality of Circumstances" test has its own limitations, and therefore can
not be of universal applicability to all Chapter 1 1 cases bearing on various situations.
b. Subjective test
Some courts, represented by courts in the Eleventh Circuit, in examining the
debtor's good faith in filing its Chapter 11 petition, attempted to ascertain the "improper
state of mind" of the debtor by reviewing its or its principals conduct before and after the
case was filed, thereby to determine whether they had an intent to cause hardship or to
22S
delay creditors without an intent or ability to reorganize. This test is called "subjective
test". The leading case using this test is In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd,226 in which the
creditors filed motions for relief from the automatic stay, and subsequently filed motions
227
to dismiss the Chapter 1 1 case. Based upon the evidence that the debtor had for years
threatened the creditor to forestall its foreclosure action because of the debtor's default on
the mortgage by filing a Chapter 1 1 petition, and actually filed the Chapter 1 1 case in the
venue 700 miles away from the place where its sole property, its employees, its secured
228
and unsecured creditors, and the pending state court proceedings were located, the
court held that all surrounding factors amounted to a subjective bad faith of the debtor
who had "an intent to abuse the judicial process and the purposes for the reorganization
provisions", and the petition was filed "to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of
secured creditors to enforce their rights." The court further held that as long as the
subjective bad faith can be established, it must naturally extend to any subsequent
reorganization proposal. As a result, any proposal submitted by the debtor who filed his
230
petition in bad faith would fail to meet Section 1129's good faith requirement.
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Although the debtor still had equity in the secured property and had a prospect of a
successful reorganization, as a matter of law, it can not transform a bad faith filing into
one undertaken in good faith.231
c. Objective-Subjective test
Some courts ultilized the Objective-Subjective test to determine the debtor's good
faith in filing the Chapter 1 1 petition. This line of cases is represented by Carolin
Corporation v. Miller, in which the court held that the issue of good faith involved
both subjective and objective dimensions, both objective futility of any possible
reorganization and subjective bad faith of the debtor in invoking Chapter 1 1 protection
must be shown to warrant dismissal for lack of good faith in filing. By first recognizing
the bankruptcy court's power to determine a filing of Chapter 1 1 is in bad faith and hence
dismiss it at the threshold was essential to proper administration of the Bankruptcy Code
policies and implicit in the statute itself, the court suggested that such power should be
exercised with great care and caution, because denying access to the reorganization
proceeding at the very beginning of bankruptcy before an ongoing proceeding had even
begun to develop the total shape of the debtor were inherently drastic and not lightly to be
2i<
made. The court should, when using this power, properly deal with the relationship
between the statutory provisions in the Bankruptcy Code and the judicially-created good
faith requirement, bearing in mind that creditors who become entangled in hopeless
Chapter 1 1 cases have remedies of relief from stay, adequate protection, and dismissal or
conversion based on the enumerated grounds in Section 1 1 12(b). Dismissal on grounds
of bad faith filing should not be judicially employed as an easy alternative to other post-
petition creditor remedies, thereby subverting the reorganization and confirmation
231
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scheme of the Code. Therefore, the court held that something more than even the most
obvious likelihood of ultimate futility, i.e. the subjective bad faith on the part of the
petitioner should be required to justify threshold dismissals for want of good faith in
238
filing. The subjective bad faith and the objective futility of reorganization should be
satisfied at the same time for dismissal. If there is no question of the debtor's subjective
bad faith, the realistic futility of reorganization should not warrant the threshold dismissal
of the Chapter 1 1 case, but be better left to the postpetition developments; likewise, if the
futility of reorganzation can not be found, the subjective bad faith can not sufficiently
239 ,
warrant the dismissal. Though such two-pronged test was stringent, the court thought
"it is better to risk proceedings with a wrongly motivated invocation of Chapter 11
protections whose futility is not immediately manifest than to risk cutting off even a
remote chance that a reorganization effort so motivated might nevertheless yield a
successful rehabilitation."
The court in this case attempted to avoid examining the good faith by
overemphasizing on particular indicia or patterns or engaging in mere indicia-counting, or
by forcing particular facts into previously identified patterns. Its objective futility
inquiry was designed to focus on assessing whether there was no on going concern to
preserve and no hope of rehabilitation;" its subjective bad faith inquiry was designed to
determine whether the petitioner's real motivation was "to abuse the reorganization
process" and "to cause hardship or to delay creditors by resort to the Chapter 1
1
device." The courts following this test have recognized that there is considerable
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overlap between the objective and subjective components, and sometimes sufficient proof
744
of either component may suffice to prove both.
d. Summary
The current situation of case law for Chapter 1 1 indicates that what kind of good
faith test are applied by courts largely depends upon their understanding of the underlying
policies in Chapter 1 1
.
The good faith tests currently used by courts actually have no substantial
difference. As Chapter 1 1 is designed for the business debtors in different scales, it has to
be admitted that the larger the debtor's scale is, the more complicated the surrounding
circumstances become, and the more difficult the inquiry of the debtor's good faith will
be. It is understandable that courts develop practical tests for different business debtors in
different scales. Obviously, the Totality of Circumstances test in the Little Creek case
is actually designed by courts particularly to deal with the single-asset debtors or new
debtor syndrome situations. It can not be used in corporate debtors which have diversified
business and various interest groups. Although the laundry list in such test has been
criticized by some courts to be rigid and inflexible, it is helpful for checking out the
debtor's bad faith in those situations and, by analyzing the totality of circumstances, the
courts usually made a final conclusion that the debtor intended to abuse the bankruptcy
proceedings without any realistic possibility of rehabilitation, which actually reaches the
same point as the Objective-Subjective test does. The critical point here is not the test
itself, but should be how the courts use this test. As the Carolin court suggested, the
totality of circumstances must be viewed that any conceivable list of factor can not be
exhaustive, no single factor alone will necessarily lead to a finding of bad faith.
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The Objective-Subject test, although developed by the Caroline court as a
practical test with universal applicability under Chapter 11 and widely accepted by
courts, has its own problems. From a philosophical standpoint, objectivity and
subjectivity actually interrelate to each other and can not be separated mechanically.
Under this test, subjective bad faith and the objective futility of reorganization must be
satisfied at the same time before a dismissal can be granted. It is obviously contradictory
to the Subjective Test, under which the subjective bad faith, i.e., the intention to abuse the
Chapter 1 1 proceeding, is sufficient to warrant a dismissal. Therefore, the issue is
whether the subjective bad faith can outweigh the prospect of successful reorganization,
which directly relates to each court's understanding of the basic spirit of the bankruptcy
law.
If the good faith filing requirement is read into section 362(d) or 1112(b),
arguably the Subjective test and the Objective-Subjective test are contrary to the language
and policies of section 362(d) and section 1112(b), both of which set forth reasons to
dismiss a case or lift the stay in a very objective way, without mentioning the subjective
intention of debtors. In applying both the Subjective test and the Objective-Subjective
test, the question is whether the court should have the power to consider the subjective
intention of the debtor. The answer should be yes. The court's inquiry of the debtor's
subjective bad faith should be justified by its equitable power, which could not be limited
by the objective statutory provisions. The examination of the subjective bad faith tries to
ensure that the debtor will use Chapter 1 1 in a manner that is consistent with the
language, policy and spirit of the Code.
Unlike a consumer debtor, the filing of a Chapter 1 1 petition for a business debtor
may lead to far-reaching influence in the operation of its business. It imposes substantial
costs on the debtor - increased legal and accounting expenses, loss of good will, potential
loss of control of the business (through appointment of a trustee), public disclosure of the
57
business' affairs, and diversion of staff time for bankruptcy matters. It can be assumed
that debtors would not incur these costs without reason. It is reasonable to presume that
most Chapter 1 1 cases are filed because of the debtors' genuine need of bankruptcy
protection. It is well established that Chapter 1 1 relief is designed to avoid liquidation
under Chapter 7, which may have a negative impact on jobs, suppliers of the business,
and the economy as a whole. The successful reorganization and maximization of the
value of the estate are the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code for business
debtors, the mere intention to take advantages from the Chapter 1 1 proceeding should
not amount to subjective bad faith. Rather, subjective bad faith should be evidenced by
the fact that it is unnecessary for the debtor to file a Chapter 1 1 case. As the central
purpose of Chapter 11 is to protect the going concern value of a business, the non-
necessity of filing Chapter 1 1 can be reflected into that the debtor has already had no
going concern value to protect or the debtor's business could continue unimpaired
without filing for bankruptcy. In the first case, the filing of Chapter 1 1 can only lead to
the deterioration of its business value and the delay of the realization of creditors' rights
which can be performed by resorting to other debt collection measures. The only
bankruptcy relief for its supposed fresh start at this time is liquidation. In the latter case,
if the debtor's business could continue unimpaired, the debtor still has the ability to pay
its debts in the normal course of its business, hence the creditors' rights can also be
adversely affected by the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. Even though in such situation the
debtor surely has a prospect of successful reorganization, it could not negate the non-
necessity of its filing of Chapter 11. Both of such situations, on the other hand, indicate
that the debtor intends to abuse bankruptcy to reach unjustified purposes.
It is true that some courts are reluctant to dismiss a case if the debtor has a real
chance to reorganize, and it is also true that the Bankruptcy Code generally requires no
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particular financial hardship to support a voluntary filing by eliminating the insolvency
and inability to pay requirements contained in the former Bankruptcy Act.251 However,
the courts should not tolerate the case in which the debtor has no need to file Chapter 1 1
.
From a practical standpoint, as case circumstances are greatly various, the non-necessity
of resorting to Chapter 1 1 may be reflected by different facts other than any going
concern value, such as cases where the debtor has the ability to satisfy the state court
judgment from its non-business assets before filing for bankruptcy. ' In case of a motion
of dismissal by creditors, such creditors should bear the burden of proving both that the
debtor has no need of bankruptcy protection and that the bankruptcy filing substantially
253
impacts the creditor's non-bankruptcy rights.
It is reasonable for the courts to hold that the debtor's bad faith in filing the
petition consists of both subjective and objective dimensions. However, the subjective
bad faith and the objective futility of reorganization should be in a dynamic balance,
based upon the key point that the Chapter 1 1 relief should only be available to those
debtors with real needs. It is not necessary that the subjective bad faith and objective
futility of reorganization should always be satisfied at the same time. Meanwhile, it
should be noted that as sections 1 1 12(b) and 362(d) have already contained such statutory
provisions as inability of reorganization, unreasonable delay to creditors as grounds to
dismiss a case or lift the stay, which cover most objective reflections of the futility of
reorganzation, so the objective dimension of the good faith inquiry shall be used as a
supplemental to those statutory provisions. If there is no prospect of reorgaization without
evidence of abusive intention on the debtor's side, the case can be dismissed or converted
into Chapter 7 according to statutory provisions of Section 1112(b) instead of filing in
251
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bad faith; if there is a prospect of reorganization but there is also clear evidence that there
is no necessity for the debtor to file Chapter 11, the case can be dismissed for lack of
good faith.
Although the good faith doctrine generally can be used as a principle to regulate
the debtor's conduct to seek bankruptcy relief for legitimate purposes, as a judicially-
made rule, the good faith filing requirement should be used prudently and restrictively.
The clearest case of bad faith would be "where the debtor enters Chapter 1 1 knowing that
there is no chance to reorganize his business and hoping merely to stave off the evil day
when the creditors take control of his business." Additionally, bad faith filing is found
where the debtor is able to pay creditors in the ordinary course, where there is no prospect
for reorganization, and where filing is for harassment."
4. Practical tests for good faith requirement for proposal of Chapter 11 plan
Unlike the judicially-made good faith filing requirement, Section 1129(a)(3)
explicitly requires that the debtor under Chapter 1 1 should propose the reorganzation plan
in good faith. However, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history have
ever provided or suggested what constitutes the debtor's good faith in this situation,
which allows the court to use its discretion in deciding each case.
a. Bad faith in proposal of plan directly caused by bad faith filing
As discussed above, some courts, when confirming a reorganization plan
proposed by the debtor, examined its good faith back to the filing of the petition.
Represented by the Eleventh Circuit, they insisted that the debtor's bad faith in filing its
petition should directly lead to the denial of confirmation of the reorganization plan. Once
it was established that the petition had been filed in bad faith, the plan, if it had already
been proposed by the debtor, should also be deemed as proposed in bad faith. "Any
255
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proposal submitted by a debtor who filed his petition in bad faith would fail to meet
section 1 129's good faith requirement"258
b. Reasonable relationship between the plan and the purposes of Chapter 1
1
Beginning by In re Nite Lite Inns, a number of courts held that a plan was
proposed in good faith if there was a reasonable likelihood that the plan would achieve a
result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the bankruptcy code. Especially in
In re Madison Hotel Associates, the Seventh Circuit clarified the difference of the
implicit good faith filing requirement and the statutory good faith proposal requirement.
Before the case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, the district court found there were
indications that the debtor's filing of reorganization may have been motivated by the sole
purpose of hindering and delaying its creditors, therefore, it held that such indication of
misuse of the bankruptcy court was sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the debtor's prefiling conduct demonstrated by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that its sole purpose in filing Chapter 11 was to hinder or delay its
secured creditors. The determination on whether a plan was filed in good faith should
not be limited to deciding only whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the plan
will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code. Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erroneously
construed the good faith test under section 1129(a)(3) and failed to make the legal
distinction between the good faith required to confirm a plan and the good faith that "has
258
Natural Land Corp., 825 F. 2d at 298.
259
17 B.R. 367 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1982).
260
Id. at 370; In re Nikron, Inc., 27 B.R. 773, 778 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Madison Hotel
Associations, 749 F. 2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Block Shim Development Company - Irving, 939 F.
2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Corey, 892 F. 2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1989); Hanson v. First Bank of
South Dakota, N.A., 828 F.2d. 1315 (8th Cir. 1987); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F. 2d 636, 649 (2d
cir. 1988); In re Coastal Cable TV., Inc. 709 F. 2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Jorgenson, 66 B.R. 104,
109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986).
261
749 F. 2d 410 (7th Cir. 1984).
262
In re Madison Hotel Associates, 29 B.R. 1003, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
263
Id.
61
been established as prerequisite to filing the petition for reorganization."
264
Relying upon
the interpretation in In re Nite Lite Inns,
265
the court held that for the purpose of
determining good faith under section 1129(a)(3), the important point of inquiry is the
plan itself and whether such plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives
and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further held that as the record
revealed that the bankruptcy court had found that "there have been sufficient efforts to
reorganize undertaken by the debtor to rebut any contention that there would be a lack of
good faith in the initial filing of the Chapter 1 1 ," such efforts were "consistent with
Congress' intent that a business reorganization experiencing cash flow problems be
allowed to file a Chapter 1 1 petition for reorganization, extend the period of its debts and
return the status of a viable entity while paying creditors in full." Therefore, there was
no need for the bankruptcy court to make another evidentiary hearing concerning the
debtor's pre-filing conduct.
The rule established by the Seventh Circuit in the case regarding the construction
of the good faith requirement for proposal of plan has been greatly relied upon by later
cases. As one court stated , since the Seventh Circuit in this case held that the district
court had erroneously construed section 1129(a)(3) when it evaluated the pre-filing
conduct of the debtor, it would not consider the motive of the debtor in filing its Chapter
1 1 petition in determining whether or not its plan fulfilled the good faith requirement for
confirmation.
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c. Subjective honest intention and objective success of reorganization
Represented by In re Sun Country Development, Inc.211 some courts held that to
be proposed in good faith, a plan must be proposed with honesty and good intentions, and
with a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected. "Where the plan is
proposed with the legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize and has a reasonable hope
of success, the good faith requirement of section 1129(a)(3) is satisfied." This test is
different from that in Madison Hotel Associate as it expressly invites the bankruptcy
court to examine the intent and motives of the plan proponent, in this case, the debtor, as
well as the feasibility of the plan. Under this formulation, a plan proposed with
273
impermissible ulterior motives was lacking in good faith.
Although the practical tests used by Madison Hotel Associates and Sun Country
for the debtors' good faith in proposing the plan appear to be different, they are actually
not mutually exclusive. Some courts cited both of them with affirmation. As the test in
Madison Hotel Associate did not expressly require a bankruptcy court to consider either a
plan's feasibility or the debtor's motives or intent in conducting a good faith analysis,
cases relying on it have further considered both the feasibility of the plan and the debtor's
275
subjective intentions and motivation.
d. Summary
Now it is well established by courts that the good faith proposal of a plan must be
viewed in light of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the making of the plan
on a case-by-case basis, keeping in mind that the purpose of the Code is to give debtors
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the opportunity to make a fresh start. The fundamental disparity among courts
regarding the good faith test under 1129(a)(3) is, whether the debtor's pre-petition
conduct should be considered in determining whether the plan has been proposed in good
faith. This difference appears to stem from whether or not the courts should limit the
"totality of circumstances" analysis to the events surrounding the making of the plan, i.e.,
*) "7 "7
the activities surrounding the negotiation, preparation and proposal of a plan. Actually
it lies in the different attitudes of courts to deal with the relationship between the good
faith filing requirement and proposal requirement.
The Subjective test held by the Eleventh Circuit, which is treated as an extension
of the good faith filing requirement, is reasonable because if there is clear evidence that
the debtor has filed its Chapter 1 1 with illegitimate purposes and no necessity, how could
its reorganization plan be in good faith?
Additionally, there is a logical deficiency when the later cases relied on Madison
Hotel Associates case, holding that there is no need to consider the debtor's motive in
filing Chapter 1 1 . Actually, what the court really held in Madison Hotel Associate case
was that there was no need for the court to consider the pre-filing conduct of the debtor if
its good faith in filing the case could be established. In that case, the debtor's good faith
in filing its Chapter 1 1 petition could be indicated from its pre-filing conduct, and thus it
would not alter the conclusion if the court only examined the plan itself to discern the
debtor's good faith in proposal of plan without considering whether the petition has been
279
filed in good faith.
It is true that there is a legal distinction between the good faith filing requirement
and the good faith proposal requirement. The good faith filing requirement is established
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by courts as an entrance test for debtors coming into Chapter 1 1 proceeding, which can be
invoked either by a motion of any party in interest or by courts themselves; the good faith
in proposal of the plan is just one of the requirements provided by the Bankruptcy Code
280
for the confirmation of the plan, and it can only be invoked by any party in interests in
the confirmation hearing of the plan; if there is no objection timely filed, the plan will be
deemed to be filed in good faith and not forbidden by law. Given such provisions,
some courts held that there was a rebuttable presumption that a plan has been proposed in
282
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law. ' However, from a practical
standpoint, when any party in interest brings up a motion to object to the plan for lack of
good faith, the court has not, either by any interested party's motion or sua sponte,
reviewed the debtor's good faith in filing the petition, would it be proper for the court to
just examine the plan to look for a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, without considering
its conduct before it proposes the plan? The answer should be no. In order to effectively
prevent the bankruptcy proceeding from being abused, and to ensure that only the
deserving debtor can obtain a fresh start from bankruptcy relief, the courts should be
realistic and flexible in using the two good faith requirements in Chapter 1 1 instead of
mechanically separating them. If the debtor has not been confronted with any good faith
challenge for its filing of Chapter 1 1 petition when it proposes the plan, the court, in
determining the debtor's good faith in proposal of the plan, should consider the debtor's
pre-filing or pre-plan conduct, or its motive in filing Chapter 1 1 to discern whether the
Chapter 1 1 relief should be necessary for the debtor, and then discern whether its plan
will achieve a result consistent with the legislative purposes of Chapter 1 1 , which include
the debtor's fresh start as well as its fair treatment to its creditors. On the other hand, as
280
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the good faith requirement in proposal of the plan is just one of the statutory confirmation
requirements and subject to motion of any party in interest, it should not therefore limit
the court's power to consider the debtor's good faith in filing its petition. Namely, even
though there is no party bringing any objection to the plan on ground of bad faith, courts
could still consider the debtor's good faith in its filing, although such good faith test
should be used restrictively.
III. Good Faith in Chapter 13
1. Introduction of Chapter 13 relief
Designed as a reorganization process for individual debtors with regular
283
incomes, Chapter 13 was initially created in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 as a
commitment of Congress to deal with the tremendous growth of consumer credits from
284
1898 to 1970s, in order to make the bankruptcy law keep pace with the social and
economic changes during this period of time, as well as to modernize the then existing
285
bankruptcy system so as to be more applicable to consumer cases. It is purported to
"enable an individual, under court supervision and protection, to develop and perform
under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended period" and "encourage
more debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather than to opt for straight
287
bankruptcy liquidation and discharge." Only debtors whose debt are under the statutory
limits may file a case in this Chapter. To be an eligible debtor under Chapter 13, an
individual with regular income must have less than $250,000 noncontingent, liquidated,
unsecured debts, and less than $750,000 noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts on the
date of filing the petition.
288
During the Chapter 13 process, the debtor retains possession
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of his assets by agreeing to repay his creditors with his postpetition income.289 The debtor
accomplishes this by developing a plan of repayment.290 The plan should list projected
debts and propose a schedule of payment to creditors, and be subject to the confirmation
by the bankruptcy court. When the debtor completes his repayments under the plan or
completes his efforts to make payments under the plan, he might be discharged of all
292
debts provided in the plan except debts for alimony and child support payments,
restitution or criminal fines and certain long-term debts covered by the plan that require
293
payments beyond the plan period. From the perspective of an individual debtor, the
discharge scope of Chapter 13 is broader than that of Chapter 7, since a wide variety of
debts which can not be discharged in Chapter 7 case, may be discharged in Chapter 13.
2. Application of Good Faith Filing Requirement
Like Chapter 1 1 , the bankruptcy court is often called upon to make two separate
good faith determinations in Chapter 13 proceedings. One is based on the statutory
language in Section 1325(a)(3) requiring the debtor to propose his plan in good faith and
not by means forbidden by law;
2 5
the other one is the judicially imposed good faith filing
requirement.
In the statutory dismissal and conversion provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for
Chapter 13, there is the same "for cause" and "including" language as in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11. Under Section 1307(c), the court may, on request of a party in interest or the
289
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United States trustee, convert a Chapter 13 case into Chapter 7, or dismiss the case,
"whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause,
including.. .denial of confirmation of a plan under 1325."296 Based upon the same
construction rules as in Chapter 7 and 1 1 , courts read the 'Tiling the petition in lack of
good faith" into this section as a sufficient "cause" to dismiss or convert a Chapter 13
case, and also believe that dismissal of a Chapter 3 1 case filed in bad faith should be
within the inherent power of the court.
3. Practical good faith tests in Chapter 13
Unlike Chapter 1 1 , the filing of the petition and the filing of the plan in Chapter
1 3 can take place simultaneously or in close temporal proximity, which, more or less,
has influenced the court decisions in connection with the two good faith inquiries. Many
courts held that in the Chapter 1 3 context, there would be substantial overlap between the
two good faith inquiries, because, under Section 1307's express language, a petition can
be rejected for the same reasons that a plan would not be confirmed, including lack of
good faith. Also, some courts paid more attention to the difference between the two
good faith requirements, and they were more reluctant to dismiss a petition under
1307(c) for lack of good faith than to reject a plan for lack of good faith under 1325(a),
insisting that the dismissal of a Chapter 13 petition for lack of good faith prior to
consideration of the plan should be ordered only under extraordinary circumstances,
because the good faith inquiry under 1307(c) is broader than that under 1325(c) and could
more likely lead to a harsh result
302
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At any rate, it seems that almost all courts have employed the same good faith
standard to examine the filing of the petition and the filing of a plan, while the good faith
formulations among them are somehow different.303
a. "Totality of Circumstances" with laundry list of factors
(i) Same standard with different formulation
Today a majority of courts, when dealing with Chapter 13 cases, hold that the
good faith inquiries of both the filing of petition and the proposal of plan are fact
intensive and should be determined on a case-by-case basis considering the "totality of
circumstances", from which the debtor's intention, motive or purport of filing the
Chapter 1 3 petition or plan can be disclosed, in order to find out whether the petition or
the plan involves debtor "abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit" of Chapter 13.
305
However, in investigating the totality of circumstances, courts have different
interpretations to what constitutes "abuse of the provision, purpose or spirit of Chapter
13". Some courts held that, as one of the primary purposes of the good faith evaluation in
both Sections 1307 and 1325 was to "force the bankruptcy court to examine whether or
not under the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse of the provision, purpose,
or spirit of the Chapter," the focus of the good faith inquiry under both Section 1307 and
Section 1325 should come down to a question of whether the filing is fundamentally fair
to creditors and, more specifically, whether it is fundamentally fair in a manner that
complies with the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions. Some courts ruled that to
ascertain the existence of bad faith, the totality of circumstances should show whether the
debtor "misrepresented facts in his petition or plan, unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy
303
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Code or otherwise filed his Chapter 13 [petition or] plan in an inequitable manner."307
Technical compliance with the Code provisions should not be sufficient to establish good
faith, there must also be some assurance that "the debtor who has invoked the
reorganization provisions of the Code does so with the purpose of accomplishing the aims
and objections of bankruptcy philosophy and policy." The requirement of good faith
should not be interpreted to permit manipulation of the statute by debtors who default on
obligations grounded in dishonesty and who subsequently seek refuge in Chapter 13 in
309
order to avoid, at minimal cost, a nondischargeable debt. Such different formulations
are based upon the court's understanding of the concept of good faith. Among the
circuits, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits agreed that the
meaning of "good faith" should be measured by "equity and good conscience", while
the D.C., Second and Ninth Circuits ruled that "good faith" should imply "honesty of
intention" or "equitable action"
The different good faith formulations actually do not have substantial distinctions
and do not eventually result in different practical approaches among courts. Under the
Totality of Circumstance test, courts have developed and recognized certain factors,
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which have formed different versions of the so-called "laundry list", and, when taken as a
whole, should constitute the debtor's good faith. It should be noted that the factors
involved for the good faith filing requirement are different from those involved in the
inquiry for proposal of the plan.
(ii). Laundry lists for the good faith inquiry to filing of petition
Initiated by the Seventh Circuit in In re Love,3n factors relevant to the Totality of
Circumstances test for the purpose of determining good faith of Chapter 13 filing include,
among others, nature of debt (including the question of whether the debt would be
nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding); timing of petition, how debts arose,
debtor's motive in filing petition, how debtor's action affected creditors, debtor's
treatment of creditors both before and after petition was filed, and whether debtor has
in
been forthcoming with bankruptcy court.
This laundry list has been relied upon by later cases,314 yet one factor in that list,
namely, whether the debt would be nondischargable in a Chapter 7 proceeding, was
questioned and rejected by some courts.
Meanwhile, there is another version of the laundry list for this inquiry, which was
established by In re Powers, and included whether (1) the debtor has few or no
unsecured creditors; (2) there has been a previous petition filed by the debtor or a related
entity; (3) the debtor's conduct pre-petition was proper; (4) the petition permits the debtor
to evade court orders; (5) the petition was filed on the eve of foreclosure; (6) the
foreclosed property is the sole or major asset of the debtor; (7) the debtor's income is
sufficient such that there is likely possibility of reorganization; (8) the reorganization
312 957 F. 2d at 1350.
313
Id. at 1357.
314
In re Gier, 986 F. 2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Lilley, 91 F. 3d. 491 (3rd Cir. 1996).
™ Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496.
3,6
135 B.R. 980 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 1991); In re Klevorn, 181 B.R. 8 (Bankr. N.D. NY. 1995).
71
essentially involves the resolution of a two party dispute, and finally, whether (9) the
debtor filed solely to obtain the protection of the automatic stay.
317
(iii) Laundry lists for the good faith inquiry to proposal of plan
The first laundry list of factors regarding the good faith inquiry for proposal of
Chapter 13 plan was made by the Eighth Circuit in In re Estus in 1982318 and have been
accepted by the other nine federal circuit courts of appeal in the following years.319 It
consists of 1 1 factors, including (1) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount
of the debtor's surplus; (2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood
of future increases in income; (3) the probable or expected duration of the plan; (4) the
accuracy of the plan's statement of the debts, expenses, and percentage repayment of
unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court; (5) the
extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors; (6) the extent to which
secured claims are modified; (7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any
such debt is non-dischargeable in Chapter 7; (8) the existence of special circumstances
such as inordinate medical expenses; (9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought
relief under the Bankruptcy Code; (10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in
seeking Chapter 13 relief; and (11) the burden which the plan's administration would
place upon the trustee.
As circumstances in every case vary greatly, it is well established that such a
laundry list is certainly not an exhaustive one. While relying on such a list, courts held
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that the good faith requirement must be a flexible one that focuses upon abuses of the
321
judicial process. Factors in the laundry list "ultimately merge into a generic 'totality of
322
the circumstances test" ' where the court must ultimately determine whether or not there
has been an "abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of the Chapter in the proposal."323
With the development of case law in Chapter 13, such a list has ever been
supplemented to consist of 17 good faith attributes, 4 including (1) frequency of
bankruptcy filing; (2) accuracy of petition statements and schedules; (3) motivation in
filing Chapter 13; (4) initial filing of Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13; (5) existence of
debt nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case; (6) circumstances of incurring the debt; (7)
nature and amount of unsecured debts; (8) probable duration of the plan; (9) degree of
effort; (10) likelihood of future increases in income; (11) percentage of repayment of
debt; (12) amount of proposed payments; (13) amount of surplus in budget; (14) special
circumstances; (15) burden of administration; (16) amount of attorney's fees, and (17)
generic test as "fundamental fairness", "honesty of intention", and "totality of the
325
circumstances."
b. Irrelevant factors in laundry lists
Though as a prevailing good faith test, the laundry lists have been criticized both
by courts and by commentators as being duplicative with the specific standards for
confirmation of Chapter 1 3 explicitly stated in the Bankruptcy Code.
(i) Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act and the Totality of
Circumstances Test
In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code by enacting the Bankruptcy
327
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA"), in which some factors in the
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laundry list were statutorily incorporated. For example, Section 109(g)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code which was added by BAFJA specifically prohibits a debtor in certain
circumstances from refiling for bankruptcy within 1 80 days of a voluntary dismissal of a
previous bankruptcy case,325 and thus "reduces in importance the need to evaluate
repetitive filings as indicative as a lack of good faith."329 Additionally, the new Section
1325 (b) stipulates that if an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation, the bankruptcy
court may not approve the plan unless that creditor is to receive full payment,330 or
alternatively, the debtor commits all of his projected disposable income to the plan for
331
three years. With such specific statutory requirements, in determining the good faith of
the debtor in proposal of the plan, any specific amount or percentage of payments to
unsecured creditors should no longer be a factor to the showing of good faith.
Because of such amendments brought by BAFJA, some courts began to doubt the
necessity of the Totality of Circumstances Test and held that BAFJA actually replaced
333
this test. As they insisted, courts should not carry along the excess baggage of such
good faith factors in the consideration process and should look elsewhere in the Code to
evaluate most of these factors. It was additionally decided that the good faith doctrine
should be reassessed to the traditional meaning of "serious debtor misconduct or abuse",
and required nothing more than "honesty in purpose and full disclosure".
However, this new, but actually traditional good faith concept- "honesty in
purpose and full disclosure" did not persuade courts to give up the "Totality of
Circumstances" test. As a court held, in enacting BAFJA, Congress demonstrated no
327
328
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2) (1996).
329
In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987).
330
11 U.S.C. §1325 (b)(1) (1996).
331
11 U.S.C. §1325 (b)(2) (1996).
332
In re Smith, 848 F. 2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1988).
333
In re Gathright, 67 B.R. 384 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), leave to appeal denied, 71 B.R. 343 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
334
Id. at 388.
335
Id. at 390.
74
specific intent to change that test, because "the normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific." Moreover, not all of the factors in the list have
337
already been covered by BAFJA.
(ii) Type of debt - Nondischargeable Chapter 7 debts in Chapter 1
3
Although most courts still adhere to the Totality of Circumstances test, they
became more restrictive and critical on the applicability of those factors regarding good
faith. The most disputed issue is whether the factor that the debtor seeks a
nondischareable debt in Chapter 7 to be discharged in Chapter 13, should be a component
of good faith inquiry. Courts have shown great disparity in it. Many courts have
confirmed Chapter 13 plans over good faith objections despite the questioned claim
would be nondischargeable in Chapter 7, holding that merely seeking nondischargeable
debts in Chapter 7 to be discharged alone could not be bad faith; still, there are other
courts that refused to confirm plans proposing to compromise nondischargeable claims.
Frankly, this issue raises the fundamental policy questions and lies in the
bankruptcy law's basic distinction between a liquidation and a reorganization proceeding.
The mere intention to discharge some debts in Chapter 13 which are not dischargeable
under Chapter 7 should not be bad faith, because the different dischargeability of the
same debts in different Chapters is the deliberate design of Congress, taking into account
its preference of Chapter 1 3 relief to Chapter 7 for consumer debtors. Thus the real issue
related to good faith is not whether a debt covered by a Chapter 13 plan is
nondischargeable in Chapter 7, but is whether courts should confirm a Chapter 13 plan
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which is proposed as solely or primarily motivated by a desire to get rid of a debt that
could not be extinguished in Chapter 7.
(iii) Accuracy of statements and schedules
From a practical standpoint, this factor is a preliminary requirement which must
be fulfilled even before the good faith inquiry is made. When the debtor files its Chapter
1 3 papers, he must sign them and attest to the completeness and accuracy of its statement
of financial affairs and schedules under penalty of perjury. The court is entitled to
receive complete and accurate schedules because almost every determination the court
makes depends upon representations made in those papers. Basically, no court will
consider any substantial issues of a plan for confirmation before it believes that all filed
documents are complete, accurate, and correct. As one court held, "the absence of
misstatements or attempted preferences in this case is not grounds for confirmation of a
plan. The presence of candor and equal treatment of creditors are expected."
(iv) The extent to which secured claims are modified
This factor in the laundry list developed by In re Estus is more questionable for
its relevance to the good faith inquiry. Under Chapter 13, the secured creditors, though
precluded from repossessing, are fully protected with respect to the secured portion of its
claim, and the remaining unsecured portion, if any, is dischargeable in any event under
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Actually the provision in Section 1325(a)(5) has ensured
the treatment to secured creditors, under which the value of property to be distributed to
the secured creditor as of the effective date of the plan on account of the secured
creditor's claim should not be less than the allowed amount of such claim, which
requires the bankruptcy court to reassess interests on the secured claim for the present
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value of the collateral in order to ensure that the value of the claim would not be
decreased by the prolonged repayment. With this bottom line, the extent to which the
secured claims are modified should not directly relate to the good faith of the plan;
instead, as one of the legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to ensure the
equitable distribution to creditors, the real issue related to good faith should be whether
the modification of secured claims held by different secured creditors is equitable.
In addition to those factors, there seems to be no reason that "burden of
administration to the trustee"
345
could be a factor for deciding the good faith of a Chapter
13 plan.
c. Summary
Although there are different good faith tests involved in case law for Chapter 1
1
and Chapter 13, as both Chapters are designed for different debtors but for the same
purpose, i.e., the debtors' rehabilitation, the essence of good faith should be the same in
both of them.
In the current situation for case law for Chapter 13, it could be found that courts
have widely recognized that the "Totality of Circumstances" with laundry list test should
be used for both good faith inquiries in filing of petition and proposal of plan, although
the elements to be considered are different. In filing for Chapter 13, the debtor's good
faith should be, as in Chapter 11, its sincere need for Chapter 1 3 relief; in proposing the
plan, it should be its honest intent to use Chapter 13 relief for legitimate purposes,
including its financial fresh start and its fair and equitable treatment to creditors. From a
technical standpoint, as the filing of petition and the filing of plan are at the same time or
so closed to each other in Chapter 13, the two good faith requirements should relate and
be interactive to each other. The debtor's pre-filing or pre-plan conduct, and the plan
itself should be considered in both good faith inquiries. It means, not only the bad faith in
345
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filing the petition can lead to the bad faith in the proposal of the plan, but also sometimes
the debtor's bad faith in the proposal of the plan should be a factor in deciding that the
petition was filed in bad faith.
When using the Totality of Circumstances test, the court should consider those
factors which show strong circumstantial evidence, instead of getting involved with those
irrelevant factors or problems which are covered or could be solved by statutory
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Such factors or problems might distract the court's
concentration on what really constitutes the debtor's good faith. On the other hand, good
faith inquiries should be used as a supplemental means to the statutory provisions in
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
CHAPTER V
GOOD FAITH IN "CHAPTER 20" LIQUIDATION PLUS REORGANIZATION
PROCEEDINGS
I. Serial Filings
In addition to seeking discharge by filing a single bankruptcy petition, sometimes
debtors file another petition after being discharged through a former one. Such serial
filings may be repetitive Chapter 1 1 or Chapter 13 filings, which means debtors seek one
more reorganization process after the confirmation or completion of its former
reorganzation plan; sometimes debtors even file a reorganization petition after being
discharged by a former liquidation process. For a business debtor, it is a Chapter 1
1
petition after a Chapter 7 discharge; for an individual debtor, it is a Chapter 13 petition
after a Chapter 7 discharge.
There is no general prohibition upon the frequency with which a debtor can file
for bankruptcy. The available statutory provisions in the Bankruptcy Code regarding
serial filings are quite limited. According to the Code, no one can file another Chapter 7
petition within six years after he has been granted a discharge under a prior Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11; no one can file another Chapter 7 petition within six years after he has
been granted a discharge under Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 unless his payments under the
plan in the prior case totalled 1 00% of the allowed unsecured claims in that case or 70%
of such claims but with his good faith and best efforts. Moreover, as amended by
346
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BAFJA in 1984, the Code further restricts that no individual or family farmer may file
a bankruptcy petition in 1 80 days after a prior case was dismissed by the court because of
the wilful failure of the debtor to comply with orders of the court or to appear before the
court, or dismissed upon request of the debtor. It seems that Congress paid more
attention to prohibiting or restricting a consecutive Chapter 7 filing by the debtor in the
post-confirmation or post-discharge era, but did not mention or notice the serial Chapter
1 1 or 13 filings or Chapter 7 plus Chapter 1 1 or 13 filings; the refiling restrictions in the
1 984 amendments have been criticized as insufficient to handle various serial filing issues
in practice.
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, some senators proposed an amendment
pursuant to which there would be a bar on refiling any Chapter 13 within 3 years.
Although the proposed amendment received surprising and substantial support in the
Senate, it was ultimately defeated by a vote of 60-34 and was criticized as a typical
example of "killing a gnat with a cannon" and of making amendments to the Code based
on a few bad example.
351
However, such proposed amendment at least indicated some
express concern for the abuse of Chapter 13.
Given the current statutory structure of the Bankruptcy Code, the legal
permissibility of serial Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 filings, as well as Chapter 7 plus
Chapter 1 1 or Chapter 13 filings are not very clear, which, on the other hand, leads to the
disparities among courts in dealing with such serial filings. With little legislative
guidance, courts have used such good faith requirements as they used in normal
bankruptcy proceedings as a policing means to prevent any abusive use of bankruptcy
process by making those serial filings.
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This chapter will discuss the application of the good faith doctrine in the
liquidation plus reorganization filing, which is a more interesting and special
phenomenon in the current bankruptcy practice; and, as the consumer bankruptcy filings
have the overwhelming weight in the total bankruptcy filings, the discussion of the good
faith doctrine will concentrate on consumer debtors' Chapter 7 plus Chapter 13 filings,
which are colloquially called "Chapter 20" filings.
II. Introduction to Chapter 20
Generally, a debtor making a Chapter 20 filing is an individual who files a
Chapter 1 3 petition after having received a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation case;
sometimes, an individual debtor even files a Chapter 13 petition while the Chapter 7
353
proceeding is still pending. For the purpose of this chapter, the former situation is
defined as "consecutive Chapter 20 filings", the latter one is defined as "simultaneous
Chapter 20 filings". In either situation, the basic motives of debtors to make such serial
filings are to achieve a continuing reimposition of the automatic stay, to discharge
debts surviving the discharge in a prior Chapter 7 case, and to either delay or avoid
foreclosure by curing arrearages under a subsequent Chapter 1 3 plan of certain secured
debts.
356
Most Chapter 20 filings follow a similar pattern: the debtor defaults in loan
payments, which are secured by a home mortgage. As a mortgage is an interest in real
property that secures a creditor's right to repayment, unless the debtor and creditor have
provided otherwise, the creditor ordinarily is not limited to foreclosure on the mortgaged
property should the debtor default his obligation; rather, the creditor may in addition sue
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to establish the debtor's in personam liability for any deficiency on the debt and may
enforce any judgment against the debtor's assets generally. By way of a Chapter 20 filing,
the defaulting debtor can protect himself from personal liability by obtaining a discharge
357
in a Chapter 7 liquidation; however, as such discharge extinguishes only the "personal
liability" of the debtor, and a creditor's right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or
358
passes through the bankruptcy, the debtor, by later filing a Chapter 1 3 petition with a
deceased total debt burden, may force the creditor to stay his foreclosure effort, and
thereby win some time to cure any arrearages in the loan through the reorganization
process and keep his home estate.
This procedure, if permitted, might be very advantageous for an individual debtor
because he may get rid of all or most of his unsecured debts and/or the personal liability
in his nondischargeable secured debts under Chapter 7; by filing a subsequent Chapter
1 3 petition, he may repay only his remaining secured debts under a Chapter 1 3 repayment
plan. On the other hand, as the Bankruptcy Code has requirements for individual
in
debtors to file a Chapter 13 petition in terms of debt limits, if the debtor initially has
too many debts to be ineligible for Chapter 13 relief, he may be able to fall within such
statutory debt limits by first filing a Chapter 7 case to discharge a majority of unsecured
debts and/or personal liability.
For debtors, the resulting benefits of such Chapter 20 filing is not available in
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 alone. For creditors, this process is generally detrimental.
But for the subsequent Chapter 13 filing, the creditors of the remaining debt surviving the
Chapter 7 discharge are able to seek state foreclosure or other proceedings to get their
money back as soon as possible, but once the Chapter 13 is filed, the foreclosure
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proceedings are stayed. Creditors are subject to the debtor's repayment plan and get
"If. A
their money back within 3-5 years; meanwhile, as all or most of unsecured debts might
be discharged in the prior Chapter 7 case, such unsecured creditors will get nothing in the
later Chapter 13 case.
Faced with such advantages to debtors and detriments to creditors derived from
the Chapter 20 filings, so far courts are very cautious when confronted with such tricky
filings. Some courts characterized them as both an abusive manipulation of the Code and
a strong indication of the debtor's bad faith because the ultililzation of the Chapter 20
case undermines the purpose and spirit of chapter 13; they also regard combining
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 remedies in this manner as exceeding the intended scope of
these chapters. They strictly apply the statutory confirmation requirements in Section
1325 of the Code when the debtor refiles a Chapter 13 case and to discourage such
filings. At the stage of the serial chapter 13 case, courts addressing the confirmation
issue primarily focus on whether the debtor's consecutive filings violate the good faith
requirement of Section 1325 (a)(3) .
Theoretically, in analyzing the Chapter 20 situation, it should also be borne in
mind that the two facets of the Bankruptcy Code, the financial fresh start of debtors and
equitable distributions among creditors should be satisfied at the same time. Then the
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first issue should be whether such extraordinary advantages to debtors caused by their
Chapter 20 filings are legitimately permitted, and if so, how creditors could be protected
at the same time.
As a Chapter 20 filing is a combination of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, the analysis
to it should begin with whether the remedies provided by Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 could
be used in combination.
III. Relationship between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 relief
As stated in former chapters of this thesis, the current Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
are the products of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. Both of them serve the
legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code by providing debtors different remedies,
which could be seen from the different procedures provided to debtors by Chapter 7 and
372
Chapter 13. Moreover, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code suggests that
Congress, when adopting both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, intended to give debtors a
choice between Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy and Chapter 1 3 prolonged repayment plans
under the premises that "the use of the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it is
used, debtor should attempt repayment under Chapter 13, ...and finally, whether the
debtor use Chapter 7 ... or Chapter 13, ...bankruptcy relief should be effective and should
provide the debtor with a fresh start." As there are eligibility requirements for debtors
to file Chapter 13, a debtor who is eligible to file under Chapter 13 and who wishes to
protect his assets may do so by "developing a plan of repayment under Chapter 13, rather
than opt for liquidation under Chapter 7." In this process, he can remain in possession
and control of his assets. The liquidation of non-exempt assets often realizes a value to
definition of claim), § 362 (automatic stay), §§524, 727, 1328 (discharge), § 507 (priority), § 547
(preference).
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creditors equal to that of a "forced-sale". A debtor can choose either Chapter which is
most fitting for his situation.
The distinction between Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 can also be indicated from the
procedural provisions of the Bankruptcy Code regarding the mutual conversion between
them. An individual debtor in Chapter 7 can request to convert his case to Chapter 1 3 at
any time while the Chapter 7 case is still pending, which gives him an opportunity to
repay his debts through reorganization process if his financial situation improves so that
he has the ability to pay; on the other hand, a Chapter 1 3 case can also be converted
into a Chapter 7 upon request by the debtor himself or by any party in interest so that the
378
debtor could switch to the liquidation process if he is unable to reorganize.
There is no further suggestion in either the legislative history of both Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 or the Bankruptcy Code language that a debtor may choose to use the
liquidation and the reorganization process in combination. Also the Supreme Court has
even noted that "differences in the requirements and protections of each Chapter reflect
Congress' appreciation that various approaches are necessary to address effectively the
379
disparate situations of debtors seeking protection under the Code."
Therefore, so far the only conclusion which can be drawn is that Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13, as a matter of fact, are designed by Congress as alternatives according to the
financial conditions of a debtor in a particular situation. There are fundamental
distinctions between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 remedies in terms of their procedures,
benefits and burdens. In essence, they should be two exclusive mechanisms. Therefore,
the Chapter 7 plus Chapter 13 filing itself, as a combination use of two Chapters, may
have dormant risks of illegality. As a court noted:
[A] "Chapter 20" filing is a two step tactic designed to implement a single
strategy to deal with a single set of financial problems. The debtor first
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sheds all unsecured debts in the Chapter 7 case and then forces the
reorganization of secured debt in the Chapter 1 3 case. A Chapter 7 case
will discharge unsecured indebtedness but provides no help in
restructuring secured debts that is in default; a Chapter 13 case can force
the restructuring of secured debts but requires a debtor to pay his
unsecured debtors with his post-petition disposable income. By using
separate cases under the two Chapters in combination, a debtor can gain
-y on
the advantages of each chapter while accepting the burdens of neither.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy process is a necessary safeguard in an economic system
which is based upon credit transactions. The system spreads among credit extenders the
costs of inevitable failures and provides periodic fresh starts for honest but unfortunate
debtors. If the benefits of a Chapter are desired, then the corresponding burdens must be
assumed. Selecting only the benefits of two different chapters without assuming the
381
burdens of those choices appears to raise serious questions of good faith.
IV. Legal Permissibility of Chapter 20
1. Silence in Bankruptcy Code
In line with the silence in the legislative history about the combination use of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 remedies, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code is mentioned as to
the Chapter 20 filing, although they have certain provisions to other kind of serial filings.
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, it appears that Congress focused upon
prohibiting serial filings in which the Chapter 7 filing is the subsequent one, but it was
silent on first Chapter 7 and then Chapter 1 3 filings.
Such silence may reveal two possibilities: (1) Congress did not intend to prohibit
the Chapter 20 filing, or (2) when enacting the Code, Congress had not realized the
382
possibility of employing two chapters or the consequences of such employment.
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2. Vague attitude of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court had also been silent on this phenomenon until June 10, 1991,
TOT
when it decided the case of Johnson v. Home State Bank. Before that, great disparities
existed among courts regarding the legal permissibility of Chapter 20 fillings, but all of
them did not directly address this issue but argued on whether a surviving secured debt in
which the in personam liability had been discharged in a Chapter 7 case could be included
in a subsequent Chapter 13 repayment plan. A majority of courts refused to include such
debts in a later Chapter 13 plan on the grounds that a debt upon which the personal
liability has been discharged is no longer a "claim" for the bankruptcy purpose, the
creditor-debtor relationship between the prepetition mortgagor and mortgagee vanishes;
in such situation reaffirmation and redemption are only ways to repay a debt discharged
in Chapter 7. Only the Eleventh Circuit Court held that although the creditor's rights
were modified by the debtor's discharge, his property rights had not been thereby
385
changed. Taking into account the intent of Congress to create an "equitable and
feasible way for the honest and conscientious debtor to pay off his debts", the deserving
debtor should not be absolutely prohibited from using this procedure, and the good
387
faith filing requirement should be sufficient to prevent improper use of Chapter 13.
388
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Johnson case resolved this conflict.
This case was also in the typical Chapter 20 pattern. Johnson executed promissory notes
totalling approximately $470,000 to the Home State Bank (the "Bank"). As security,
Johnson executed a mortgage on his farm property. Johnson defaulted, and the bank
began foreclosure proceedings in state court. Johnson then filed a petition for liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court discharged Johnson's
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personal liability on the note, then lifted the automatic stay. The bank proceeded to
foreclose, and the state granted the bank an in rem judgment of approximately $200,000.
After the judgment, but before the foreclosure sale, Johnson filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 13, listing the bank's mortgage lien as a "claim" against his
estate.
By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the
mortgage lien in which the personal liability of the debtor has been discharged in a
Chapter 7 proceeding remains a 'claim' against the debtor and can be rescheduled under
389
Chapter 13. Moreover, in light of the absence of a prohibition on serial filings of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 and the explicit prohibitive provisions for other serial filings,390
the Court believed that "Congress did not categorically foreclose the benefit of Chapter
1 3 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7 relief. " As long as
the debtor met the eligibility requirements under Chapter 13, he may propose a repayment
392
plan for the bankruptcy court's confirmation. A bankruptcy court was authorized to
confirm a plan only if the court found that it met the requirements under Chapter 13,
among which the "good faith" of the debtor when proposing the plan should be in the
first place.
394
However, the Court did not further specify the good faith of the debtor in
such Chapter 7 plus Chapter 1 3 filings.
This case has been recognized as a milestone for Chapter 20 cases and widely
cited by courts in later decisions. The Supreme Court's decision in this case made two
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contributions: first, the Court confirmed the permissibility of the patterned Chapter 20
filing by clarifying the definition of "ciaim"; second, it pointed out that "good faith" and
other statutory requirements under Chapter 13 are the tools to prevent debtors from
abusively using Chapter 20 filings.
However, there are also some weaknesses in this decision. First, although the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend to absolutely prohibit Chapter 20 fillings,
its conclusion was drawn from the plain language of the Code regarding Congress'
prohibition of other serial filings, thereby revealing congressional intent on such serial
filing. With such a logical reasoning, it was not completely persuasive that Congress
could allow or implicitly allow one kind of serial filing just by disallowing others;396
second, although the Court pointed out the importance of "good faith" and other Chapter
13 requirements as tools to police Chapter 13 cases, it did not realize the potential result
of such filings if debtors take advantage from such filings, its failure to provide any
further guidance on how to apply it in such "enhanced" Chapter 1 3 filings, together with
its presumption that the Congress did not absolutely prohibit the Chapter 20 filings, if
relied by courts in the same way, may lead to disparity in the practical standards used by
courts when dealing with such filings.
In consideration of the weaknesses of the Supreme Court's decision in this case, it
had better be concluded that the legal permissibility of such filings is still unclear until
Congress makes a clear statement on this issue; in practice, it would be a dilemma for the
courts because they have to strike a balance between the legislative purpose of the Code
to provide fresh start opportunity to the honest but unfortunate debtors, and be alert to the
superbenefits to them by bringing such filings. Before it is clarified, Chapter 20 filings
may keep taking place, whether it should be permitted or not will depend on the factual
analysis of courts on the circumstances in each case. However, in light of the mutual
exclusive relationship between Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 relief, even though Chapter 20
396
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filings are not absolutely prohibited, they should be permitted in very narrow and limited
circumstances. Only the good faith of the debtor in filing the Chapter 1 3 petition or
proposing the plan, can justify the legitimacy of such Chapter 20 filing.
V. Good Faith in Chapter 20
1. Good faith formulation in Chapter 20
Based upon the analysis above, the debtor's good faith in a Chapter 20 filing
should definitely need more scrutiny than in any single bankruptcy process under any
Chapter. The determination of good faith should be, not only on the basis of the overall
legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, but also in light of the special
characteristics of Chapter 20.
As the good faith inquiry to the debtor's Chapter 20 filing takes place in the
subsequent Chapter 13 stage, it is quite natural that the court use its good faith
formulation as well as applicable tests developed in Chapter 1 3 case law to fulfil that. As
stated in the last chapter, a majority of courts recognize that the debtor's good faith under
Chapter 13 should be disclosed from its intention, motive or purposes of filing the
Chapter 13 petition or plan in order to find out whether the debtor is abusing the
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provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter 13. Bad faith may be reflected by unfair
treatment of creditors or misrepresentation of facts or manipulation of other Bankruptcy
Code provisions. However, in case of Chapter 20 filings, the subsequent Chapter 13
petition happens in the background of the former Chapter 7 discharge, both the former
Chapter 7 and the current Chapter 13 should be taken as a whole. Subjectively, the
debtor's good faith in filing the Chapter 13 should be his honest intention to reorganize
and pay the remaining nondischargeable debts surviving the Chapter 7 discharge with his
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See supra text accompanying note 304.
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future disposable income; objectively, when looking at his Chapter 20 filing as a
whole, it should indicate that the debtor's filing Chapter 20 is not using Chapter 7 and
Chapter 1 3 process as a mere combination to get extraordinary benefits from that, instead,
there must be some factors existing between his first discharge under Chapter 7 and his
subsequent filing of Chapter 13, which can make his serial filings substantially not a mere
combination. If such serial filing is tolerated, that means the debtor is permitted to get
those extraordinary benefits which he could not get in either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13; as
those benefits have directly influence to creditor's interests, therefore at the same time the
court should be assured that creditors will be fairly treated by such serial filing.
2. Applicable good faith tests in Chapter 20
Since the Supreme Court's holding in the Johnson case did not furnish any
guidance to courts for their good faith inquiries in Chapter 20 cases, the majority of
courts, either before or after the Johnson case, have been following the "Totality of
Circumstances" test plus the laundry list they used in Chapter 1 3 cases to deal with such
"special" Chapter 13 cases.
Among the courts using such test, they have developed and recognized some
specific rules to deal with Chapter 20 filings. As the legal permissibility of Chapter 20
filings has not been clarified by Congress or by the Supreme Court, courts commonly
held that the successive filings of one Chapter 7 and one (or more) Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition(s) did not constitute bad faith per se; the finding of good faith in
399
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (B) (1996).
[T]he court shall confirm a plan if the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim
objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless ...the plan
provides all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the three-year
period..."
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In re Metz, 820 F. 2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987)(after receiving discharge in Chapter 7 case, debtor filed two
consecutive Chapter 1 3 petitions, the second Chapter 1 3 was confirmed)
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Id. at 1496; see also In re Baker, 736 F. 2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1984) (prior chapter 7 filing is not an
automatic bar to a Chapter 13 filing); In re Gayton, 61B.R. 612, 614 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (Chapter 7
discharge followed by chapter 13 plan does not constitute bad faith).
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Chapter 20 cases should be a matter of fact;402 the debtor's successive filings as well as
the result achieved by such filings should be examined together.403
At the same time, courts rely on the laundry list to discern the debtor's good faith.
They concentrate on some factors in the "laundry list" which are more directly related to
Chapter 20 filings. Those factors may include the nature of obligations proposed in the
Chapter 13 plan, the change of circumstances between the filing of the Chapter 7
petition and Chapter 13 petition, overall treatment to creditors,406 the history of
bankruptcy filings, length of time between the prior cases and the present case;407 whether
the successive cases were filed to obtain the favourable treatment afforded by the
automatic stay; the effort made to comply with prior plans, and the fact that Congress
intended debtors to achieve their goals in a single case.
Because courts determine good faith on a case-by-case basis, the evidentiary
weight given to each circumstantial factor necessarily varies with the facts of each case.
However, as the circumstances of a Chapter 20 case may be more condensed than a
normal Chapter 1 3 one, the traditional "totality of circumstances" test supported by the
laundry list of factors could not be so precise or effective as in a normal Chapter 1 3 case
(even in Chapter 13 cases, such laundry list does not always help). The inquiry of the
debtor's good faith should be concentrated on those factors which can directly evidence
402
Metz, 820 F. 2d at 1496; Baker, 736 F. 2d at 482 (debtor's intentions in filing chapter 13 plan is a
question of fact for the bankruptcy court); Public Finance Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F. 2d 219, 221 (5th Cir.
1983) (reasonableness of plan is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard); In re Slade, 15 B.R. 910,
91 1 (9th Cir. BAP 1981) (whether debtor's chapter 13 plan is proposed in good faith is a question of fact
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard).
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Metz, 820 F. 2d at 1497 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Ligon, 97 Bankr. 398, 405 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1989); In re
Sanchez, 20 Bankr. 431, 432 (Bankr. W. D. Tex. 1982) (court reviewed results of Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 to find that debtor did not deal fairly with all creditors); see also Newfeld v. Freeman, 794 F. 2d 149,
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the debtor's intention or purpose in filing the subsequent Chapter 13 case. In light of the
special characteristics of Chapter 20 filings, there should be two major factors which can
be of general applicability to Chapter 20 filings and can justify the legitimacy of such
filings more persuasively.
a. Consecutive Chapter 20 filings: Change of circumstances
By studying the Chapter 20 cases already handed down by courts using the
"Totality of Circumstances" test, it can be found that there is a factor which is
prevailingly determinative to evidence the debtor's good faith in making the Chapter 20
filing. That factor is the "change of circumstances" of the debtor. The Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits and some other district or bankruptcy courts have recognized it to be a
controlling factor and is "precisely what the bankruptcy judge should examine to
determine whether successive filings are proper." The circumstances here should refer
to those which can directly influence the financial ability of the debtor. In a variety of
cases, the "change of circumstances" may be the increase of debtor's income, recovery
from serious illness or obtaining a new and higher-paid job, etc.
The "Change of Circumstances" should be the threshold condition for a debtor
who files a Chapter 13 petition in the shadow of the prior Chapter 7 discharge. As noted
above, the legislative history clearly indicates that Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 were enacted
to allow debtors who face different situations to obtain the relief and the fresh start that
Cases considering this factor in determining good faith in a Chapter 20 proceeding include: In re
Saylors, 869 F. 2d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir. 1989) (increased monthly income); Metz, 802 F. 2d at 1498
(debtors increased salary made in possible for the first time to propose a cure of mortgage arrearage);
Johnson, 708 F. 2d at 868 (increased income); In re Hornlein, No, 91-1923-8P3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 8,
1991) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy library, Bankr. file) (debtor no longer lives with alcoholic husband who squandered
all their funds); In re Ligon, 97 Bankr. 398, 404 (Bankr. N. D. 111. 1989) (court must determine whether
there has been a change in circumstances such that he can now make mortgage payments he could not have
made before); In re Caldwell, 151 B.R. 131, 132 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (absence of a marked change in
circumstances, the scrutiny level will increase as the interval between the two cases decrease); In re
Sunderland, 57 B.R. 39 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) ( debtor's immediate filing of Chapter 13 case after he
received his Chapter 7 discharge, together with lack of any substantial change in circumstances, was factor
bearing on debtor's "good faith").
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re Edwards, 87 Bankr. 671, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988).
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the Bankruptcy Code was intended to provide; also, each individual Chapter of the Code
was intended to provide this relief.
412
Therefore, when the debtor's situation, namely,
something about his financial ability remains unchanged, the remedy available to him
should be the same, then his subsequent filing of a Chapter 13 would be just a
supplemental use to the Chapter 7 relief, and thereby constitute an abuse to the
bankruptcy process. Otherwise, if in the time span between the prior Chapter 7 discharge
and the subsequent Chapter 1 3 petition, there is a material change of circumstances about
the debtor, which makes the debtor able to repay the debt surviving the Chapter 7
discharge, for example, cure the default in the home mortgage, in the later 3 or 5 years, at
this time the court can make a compromise between the debtor's ultimate fresh start and
the creditor's immediate collection effort towards such debt, to permit the debtor to
perform his obligations to the creditor through the reorganization process. In the current
situation, only the change of circumstances can justify the narrow space which the
Bankruptcy Code leaves to debtors between the non-absolute prohibition of the Chapter
20 filing and the mutual exclusion of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 remedies,
b. Simultaneous Chapter 20 filings: "Timing of filing" plus "Change of Circumstances"
As analyzed above, the "Change of circumstances" test makes more sense for the
"consecutive Chapter 20 filings" which take place after the prior Chapter 7 discharge has
been granted and the case has been closed. In case of the "simultaneous Chapter 20
filings" in which the subsequent Chapter 1 3 filings is made when the prior Chapter 7 case
is still pending, this test also can hardly be applicable. From a practical standpoint, if
the change of circumstances occurred when the debtor is still in the Chapter 7 proceeding,
which make him become able to repay his debts with certain years, he can directly
412
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4 1
4
convert his Chapter 7 case into Chapter 13. In such a situation it does not make any
sense for him to file another Chapter 1 3 petition which costs more time and money.
The simultaneous Chapter 20 filings, although very few, are more sensitive in
terms of the debtor's good faith. At first blush, the debtor's simultaneous filling of
Chapter 1 3 might have more inclination to manipulate the remedial process provided by
the Code with probably more intentions of abuse. Thus, as recognized by courts, such
filings should be given an "intensified level of scrutiny," especially, more attention
should be paid to the exact timing of their filings.
It should be noted that the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history have no
explicitly prohibitive provisions for such simultaneous Chapter 20 filings or any other
simultaneous filings. Some courts insist that under no circumstances may a debtor file
a separate Chapter 1 3 petition where a Chapter 7 is pending, regardless of the point to
which the prior proceedings progressed on the ground of the so-called "single-estate"
theory, which means the filing of two simultaneous bankruptcy petitions is contrary to
the contemplated function of the Bankruptcy Code to resolve the debtor's financial
problems by administration of his property as a single estate under a single Chapter
within the Bankruptcy Code, because the Bankruptcy Code provides different discharge
remedies in different Chapters, and such remedies are intended to be exclusive for each
estate, so a subsequent Chapter 1 3 petition may not be permitted until at the earliest, after
4 1 X
the granting of the discharge in the prior Chapter 7 case. However, some other courts
do not support such an extreme position. They permit a serial petition filed during the
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predischarge period in the prior case, as they are more realistic about the time consuming
feature of a bankruptcy process. As sometimes the debtor has been granted a discharge in
Chapter 7, but the case has not been closed because of administrative reasons on the
court's side, the debtor should be permitted to file a Chapter 13. Although according to
the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee "has the duty to collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously
as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest," in practice, for various
reasons, there might be considerable time elapsed from the grant of discharge to the
actual close of the Chapter 7 case. Therefore the most proper and realistic way for courts
to deal with such cases is to analyze them on a case-by-case basis, as long as there is a
substantial change of circumstances which can justify the debtor's good faith.
Therefore, in case of simultaneous Chapter 20 filings, the "Change of
Circumstances" test should be subordinated to the examination of the timing of the filing
of the subsequent Chapter 13, but it should still be the ultimately determinative factor of
the debtor's good faith.
c. Good faith of the Chapter 13 plan in a Chapter 20 case: fair treatment to creditors
The change of circumstances can, in some ways, justify the debtor's good faith in
filing the subsequent Chapter 13 petition after a Chapter 7 discharge. As the good faith
inquiry takes place in the stage of Chapter 13, the statutory good faith requirement for the
Chapter for the Chapter 13 plan under Section 1325(a)(3) should also be met at the same
time.
Taking the result of the prior Chapter 7 and the subsequent Chapter 1 3 as a whole,
it could be found that some creditors would likely be treated unfairly. Two features of
Chapter 20 filings lead to such unfair treatment. First, in the prior Chapter 7 case, all or
A,9
Strause, 97 B.R. at 22.
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rule against two simultaneously pending bankruptcy cases, although such a situation may be an indication
of bad faith if there is no change of circumstances between the first and second petitions.)
96
most of the unsecured debts might be discharged. In the later Chapter 13 case, the debtor
might have no or few unsecured debts and be able to repay its major debts which are
nondischargeable in the prior Chapter 7 case.
422
As the Codes requires the debtor under a
Chapter 13 case to use all his future disposable income to make payments under the
plan, " without the Chapter 7 discharge, the unsecured creditors might be paid more in
the Chapter 13 plan with such disposable income; after the Chapter 7 discharge, even if
the debtor has disposable income that would be available to pay unsecured creditors, it is
not necessary to do so because there are almost no unsecured debts, they have already
been discharged. Second, as a nondischargeable debts in a prior Chapter 7 case would
likely be paid and discharged in a later Chapter 13 case, the debtor might have been
implicitly allowed to prefer one creditor over other creditors whose claims are discharged
in Chapter 7.
As the fair treatment to creditors is another facet of the legislative purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code, and, the Supreme Court has also established that the bankruptcy court,
as a court of equity, should have a duty to ensure fair treatment to creditors, the
Chapter 13 plan in a Chapter 20 case should particularly reflect this principle. When
examining the plan, the court should consider the creditors whose debts have been
discharged in the prior Chapter 7. So far, no prevailing approach has been recognized by
courts to assure the fair treatment to creditors in the later Chapter 1 3 plan. Some courts
require the debtor to demonstrate that creditors would be dealt with fairly, not merely in
each respective proceeding, but in the entire Chapter 20 situation. The debtor is
required to notify all Chapter 7 creditors of the subsequent Chapter 1 3 case, including
those whose debts have been discharged. If a Chapter 13 case is filed within one year
422
See supra text accompanying notes 355,356; see also 1 1 U.S.C. §522(c)(2) (1996).
423
See supra note 399.
424
In re Russo, 94 Bankr. 127, 130 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1988).
425
American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940).
426
See supra text accompanying note 404.
427
In re Sunderland, 57 B.R. 39 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
97
of the Chapter 7 filing, the Chapter 13 debtor must include the Chapter 7 trustee and all
creditors who were scheduled in the prior Chapter 7 case, and all debts which have been
or will be discharged in Chapter 7 case in the Chapter 13 schedules, lists and master
mailing matrix in order to afford such Chapter 7 creditors an opportunity to object to the
confirmation of the Chapter 1 3 plan, for all unsecured debtors whose claims were
discharged in the prior Chapter 7 case, and they must be told specifically that no
repayment is proposed for them in the Chapter 13 plan.429 All debtors are expected to be
present and testify at the confirmation hearing to determine whether the plan is proposed
in good faith.
VI. Summary
The serial filing of Chapter 7 plus Chapter 1 3 is so special among all kinds of
serial filings because Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 are designed as two mutually exclusive
remedies for a debtor's fresh start. Although Congress has never mentioned that a debtor
can use the two Chapters as a combination to get all the benefits provided by both
Chapters, neither has it ever explicitly addressed the legal permissibility of such Chapter
20 filings, it is clear that a pure combination use of them will be contrary to the
legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and likely constitutes an abuse of the
bankruptcy process. The existence of Chapter 20 filings is actually an embarrassing
situation. The good faith requirements for the debtor become extremely important in this
situation.
In recent years, Chapter 20 filings are not as frequent as in the 1980s, when
Chapter 7 and Chapter 1 3 were newly promulgated. In Dewsnup v. Timm , the Supreme
Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor may not "strip down" a creditor's lien on real estate to
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the value of the collateral. This means a debtor no longer will be able to discharge any
portion of her home mortgagee's lien as an unsecured debt in Chapter 7, which makes
Chapter 20 filings less attractive than before. However, this rule does not "technically
signify the end of Chapter 20 filing", under which the creditor will be better off only in
case its claim is undersecured, i.e. the value of the collateral is less than the value of its
claim. By way of Chapter 20 filing, the debtor still can get his personal liability
discharged in Chapter 7 and repay the surviving debt in the subsequent Chapter 13.
Until Congress or the Supreme Court expressly addresses the legal permissibility
of Chapter 20 filings, debtors may continue these filings for various reasons. The good
faith analysis should still be valuable and be given sufficient attention by bankruptcy
courts.
432 id
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Anthony N. Loconte, Jonhson v. Home State Bank and the "Chapter 20" Dilemma, 25 Conn. L. Rev.
173(1992).
CONCLUSION
The good faith issue has always been one of the most disputable issues in the U.S.
bankruptcy field. The discussion for it has not ended up with certain conclusion. As the
Bankruptcy Code greatly changes the traditional debtor-creditor relationship founded by
nonbankruptcy laws, but such traditional relationship directly influences or forms the
fundamental values or believes held by people in any normal economic or social
transactions, the modification of such relationship by the bankruptcy law must be
justified or supported by something which can help the existence or implementation of
the bankruptcy law and not deviate, or deform those fundamental values or believes of
people. The debtor's good faith in filing its bankruptcy petition, and in case of
reorganization, the good faith in filing its reorganization plan will definitely be such
justification or support.
As analyzed in this thesis, good faith in the bankruptcy context has an obviously
different meaning from that in the UCC. The debtor's good faith in bankruptcy
proceedings is a duty or obligation not only to creditors, but also to courts. The
requirements of good faith, either in the statute or in the judicial process, provide a
mechanism to regulate the debtor's conduct and provide remedies for creditors. Good
faith requirements are also instruments to balance the interests between the debtor and its
creditors. It can be taken as a baseline measure by creditors or by courts to challenge or
doubt the debtor's conduct in the bankruptcy proceeding. The good faith doctrine
functions more actively and effectively in some situations where the Bankruptcy Code
does not have a clear position, such as serial filings, to afford fundamental warranties to
the implementation of bankruptcy policies.
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However, as good faith is such a subjective and flexible concept, it will vary in
each judge's or each creditor's mind. Without any authoritative guidance, its application
will likely lead to great uncertainties and disparities. It could easily become a smell test.
Now the problem in the US bankruptcy practice is not whether the debtor's good faith
should be required, but is how such requirement should be employed in order to, on one
hand, police the bankruptcy proceedings from being abused; on the other hand, ensure the
implementation of the fresh start policy and avoid practical uncertainties or disparities.
The debtor's good faith in filing its petition or proposing its plan should be
understood in light of the legislative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the
specific characteristics of the specific bankruptcy proceeding selected by the debtor.
How to understand the debtor's good faith in a certain bankruptcy proceeding actually
accords with how to understand the spirit of the current bankruptcy law. Based upon the
analysis in this thesis, the debtor's good faith, when filing a petition, could be at least
summarized as his/its legitimate motives or intentions to utilize the proposed bankruptcy
relief to adjust duties or obligations to creditors; put in an objective way, it should be an
actual necessity from the part of the debtor to resort to certain bankruptcy relief; when it
proposes its reorganization plan in any reorganization proceeding, its good faith should
be reflected so that the adjustment of its obligation owing to creditors in the plan can help
it obtain a financial fresh start, while at the same time, ensure an equitable distribution to
its creditors.
Although bankruptcy courts have their independent judicial powers, most of them
use the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as a basis to develop and impose
their own rules and standards in the course of case decisions. At present, with courts
lacking in any authoritative guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court to how to
define and apply good faith in the bankruptcy context, they have not paid enough
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attention on how to deal with the relationship between the judicially-made rules or
standards and the statutory provisions when determining the debtor's good faith.
To solve the current confusing situation, there are at least two alternative
measures that Congress or the Supreme Courts can take. First, if Congress admits the
judicially-made good faith requirement, it can codify it, as it did in the pre-Code
Bankruptcy Act, and make some further efforts to define good faith in the bankruptcy
context, as states did in the UCC. Second, it can substantiate or quantify its good faith
standard into specified statutory provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, such as those factors
already recognized by courts in their "Totality of Circumstances" tests. As good faith is
always attached to people's conduct, some existing statutory provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code actually are factual descriptions of good faith, in violation of which
obviously constitutes bad faith. The most persuasive instance of such provisions is
section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. In that section, Congress did an excellent job to set
forth those circumstances under which the debtor shall be denied discharge. Those
circumstances include conduct which can directly constitute bad faith in a broad sense.
As there are no counterpart provisions in other Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, some
bankruptcy experts suggested that Congress should use the same effort they did in
Chapter 7 to incorporate those circumstances into a good faith standard of confirming a
plan in Chapter 13. However, at the same time, it has to be admitted that as the good
faith determination is a fact-driven one, the factual description method has its weakness
because the factual possibilities can never be exhausted. More space should be left to
judges for their discretion. Therefore, in comparison of these two alternative methods, the
first one should be more feasible and reasonable.
Among the issues which should be solved regarding good faith, the most urgent
one is the legitimacy of the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7. Unlike the same
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judicially-made requirement in any other proceeding, it is the most baseless one, even the
pre-Code Bankruptcy Act, which provided the good faith filing requirement in the
reorganization proceeding, has never had this requirement for liquidation. Most courts
have imposed this requirement on Chapter 7 debtors because they have imposed the same
in Chapter 1 1 and 13. No court has ever analyzed its legitimacy according to the specific
characteristics of Chapter 7. The solution to this issue will directly affect the solution to
the relationship between section 707(a) and 707(b), i.e., treatment to consumer debts and
business debts in Chapter 7.
Moreover, the legal permissibility of Chapter 20 and other serial filings which
have not been covered by the current Bankruptcy Code, or the good faith standards
applicable in such serial filings should be further clarified.
Finally, it should be noted that to recognize the importance of the good faith
doctrine in the US bankruptcy legislation and judicial practice would not lead to harsh
treatments to debtors or block their future of fresh start; on the contrary, it will help build
up a healthy bankruptcy concept in the US society, prevent bankruptcy fraud, and support
the economy to develop in a positive way.
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